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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SECONDARY STAKEHOLDERS AS AGENTS OF INFLUENCE: THREE ESSAYS
ON POLITICAL RISK, REPUTATION, AND MULTINATIONAL PERFORMANCE
by
David Adam Wernick
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Sumit Kundu, Major Professor
Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social
movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other secondary stakeholders
attempt to influence corporate behavior. Scholars, however, have yet to carefully probe
the link between secondary stakeholder legal action and target firm stock market
performance. This is puzzling given the sharp rise in NGO-initiated civil lawsuits against
corporations in recent years for alleged overseas human rights abuses and environmental
misconduct. Furthermore, few studies have considered how such lawsuits impact a target
firm’s intangible assets, namely its image and reputation. Structured in the form of three
essays, this dissertation examined the antecedents and consequences of secondary
stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and empirical settings.
Essay One argued that conventional approaches to understanding political risk fail
to account for the reputational risks to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by
transnational networks of human rights NGOs employing litigation-based strategies. It
offered a new framework for understanding this emerging challenge to multinational
corporate activity. Essay Two empirically tested the relationship between the filing of
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human rights-related civil lawsuits and corporate stock market performance using an
event study methodology and regression analysis. The statistical analysis performed
showed that target firms experience a significant decline in share price upon filing and
that both industry and nature of the lawsuit are significantly and negatively related to
shareholder wealth. Essay Three drew upon social movement and social identity theories
to develop and test a set of hypotheses on how secondary stakeholder groups select their
targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits. The results of a logistic regression model
offered support for the proposition that MNE targets are chosen based on both interest
and identity factors. The results of these essays suggest that legal action initiated by
secondary stakeholder groups is a new and salient threat to multinational business and
that firms doing business in countries with weak political institutions should factor this
into corporate planning and take steps to mitigate their exposure to such risks.
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I. Introduction
In his seminal book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) economist Albert O.
Hirschman theorized that when confronted with declining performance on the part of an
entity with which they have a relationship -- whether a business, government, or political
party – individuals and organizations choose to either withdraw from the relationship
(i.e., exit), repair it through communication or protest (i.e., voice), or remain quiescent
(i.e., loyalty). In recent years sociologists and organizational scholars have invoked
Hirschman’s framework to explain how social movements, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and other activist groups use “voice” to promote institutional
change (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005), and influence corporate policies (King &
Soule, 2007; Rao, 2009).
Hirschman’s ideas have had particular resonance with organizational researchers,
who have sought to marry his framework with stakeholder theory (King & Soule, 2007;
King, 2008; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Lenox & Eesley, 2009). Stakeholder theory
(Freeman, 1984) identifies activist groups as secondary stakeholders, which, unlike
primary stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, and
regulators), have neither a transactional relationship with the firm nor legal authority over
it (Clarkson, 1995). Moreover, the firm is not dependent on secondary stakeholders for its
survival (Frooman, 1999). As such, these groups should have limited influence over
corporate decision-makers, who are typically attuned to the interests and demands of
more salient stakeholders – those with power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell, Agle, &
Wood, 1997). And while secondary stakeholders face considerable obstacles in their
dealings with corporations (Clarkson, 1995), by skillfully leveraging human resources
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(Yaziji & Doh, 2009), information technology (Hart & Sharma, 2004), and relationships
with the media, investors, and other stakeholders (Frooman, 1999), they have often been
able to advance their agendas (Doh & Teegen, 2003; Soule, 2009; Spar & LaMure, 2003;
Yaziji & Doh, 2009).
Meanwhile, since NGOs tend to enjoy high levels of legitimacy (Yaziji, 2004),
they have increasingly become highly sought after partners by firms seeking to burnish
their images, enhance their reputations, and protect their brand equity (Dahan, Doh,
Oetzel, and Yaziji, 2010; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Given the proliferation of NGOs in recent
years, the growing scope of their activities, and the increasing complexity of the ties
between firms and NGOs – both adversarial and cooperative -- a more nuanced
understanding of secondary stakeholder activism and its relationship to multinational
financial performance is clearly warranted. This dissertation aims to provide such an
understanding.
Structured in the form of three essays, this dissertation examines the antecedents
and consequences of secondary stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and
empirical settings. Essay One situates the phenomena within the international business
and strategy literatures on political risk (Kobrin, 1982; Wells, 1998; Oetzel, 2005), and
the sociology-based literature on social risk (Yaziji, 2005; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). It argues
that both frameworks offer important insights into secondary stakeholder legal activism,
but that each ultimately falls short in key areas, thereby necessitating new theorizing. It
puts forth a new conceptual construct – transnational legal risk – to explain the emerging
threat to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by transnational human rights networks
and offers implications for theory and practice.
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Essay Two empirically tests the relationship between the filing of human-rights
related lawsuits and MNE stock market performance. Using an event study methodology
and regression analysis, it shows that target firms experience a significant decline in share
price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit have a significant and
negative relationship to shareholder wealth.
Essay Three explores the issue of why certain firms are targeted for anti-corporate
campaigns while others escape scrutiny. Drawing upon social movement and social
identity theories, the study develops and tests a set of hypotheses on how stakeholder
groups select their targets for human-rights related lawsuits. Support is found for the idea
that MNE targets are selected based on both interest and identity factors, including social
performance and financial performance. Conclusions and implications for practice are
drawn.

Essay 1 – Transnational Legal Activism: A New Form of Political Risk?

This essay begins by reviewing two recent cases of North American MNEs that
have been targeted by activist groups over alleged misconduct in developing countries –
Chevron and Talisman Energy. In both cases the companies were sued in U.S. federal
courts under a formerly obscure 1789 legal statute known as the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), which allows foreign individuals to file civil lawsuits against former government
officials, private individuals, and corporations for serious violations of international law.
The ATS has been used since the mid-1990s to sue MNEs, with more than 100 cases
filed, involving over 150 corporate defendants (Drimmer, 2010). High-profile ATS cases
have involved allegations of MNE support for genocide and ethnic cleansing in Sudan
3

(Kobrin, 2005), repression against non-violent protesters occupying an offshore oil
platform in Nigeria (Frynas, 2004), aiding and abetting forced labor, torture, rape and
other crimes against humanity as part of a natural gas pipeline project in Burma (Spar &
LaMure, 2003), and complicity in extrajudicial killings of trade union leaders at beverage
bottling plants and coal mines in Colombia (Shamir, 2004). In addition to contesting
these lawsuits inside the courtroom, both Chevron and Talisman have been targeted by
activists with boycotts, protests, shareholder resolutions, and other extra-legal tactics.
These cases are part of a growing trend of transnational legal activism, instigated by U.S.
and European NGOs to pressure MNEs with operations in the developing world –
particularly large natural resource firms -- to change their business practices and make
other concessions (Drimmer, 2010).
But from the firm’s perspective, does the prospect of being sued in U.S. courts for
alleged human rights violations and other misconduct in foreign countries represent a
type of political risk? An argument could certainly be made that it does based on the
classical international business (IB) literature on the topic (e.g., Robock, 1971; Kobrin,
1982; Simon, 1984). Yet the political risk literature focuses on governmental actions
(e.g., expropriations and discriminatory policies) in the host country as the chief source of
firm-level risk (de la Torre & Neckar, 1988; Henisz & Zelner, 2003, Wells, 1998),
whereas the emerging threat of legal activism emanates primarily from non-governmental
actors in the home country or in multiple countries. In addition, the political risk literature
tends to focus on the direct operational costs of government interference, whereas the
new threat of legal activism involves both direct and indirect costs, such as damage to
corporate images, reputations, and brands (Drimmer & Lamorre, 2011).
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The literature on “social risk” (Yazjij, 2005; Yaziji & Doh, 2009) calls attention
to these indirect costs of activism, as well as the unique pathway in which influence is
exerted – from secondary stakeholder groups to the firm via the intermediary of “critical
players” (e.g., public pension funds, customers, the media, regulators, the courts, and the
general public). Yet the social risk literature, for all its merits, tends to ignore the direct
costs of activism and focuses primarily on NGO mobilization in the developed world,
rather than mobilization by transnational networks of activist groups spanning multiple
nations.
In addition to reviewing and synthesizing these literatures on political and social
risk, this first essay provides an overview of the origins and evolution of corporate ATS
litigation, along with an analysis of the NGOs that have pioneered its use and the legal
and extra-legal tactics they routinely employ to gain leverage over their corporate targets.
A new conceptual construct – transnational legal risk – is offered to explain the emerging
threat to MNEs posed by these networks. The essay concludes with implications for
theory and practice.

Essay 2: Secondary Stakeholder Legal Action and Stock Market Performance: An Event
Study of Alien Tort Statue Litigation Filed Against Multinational Enterprises: 1993-2010

A growing body of empirical research has emerged in recent years that examines
the relationship between shareholder wealth and stakeholder influence tactics such as
boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; King, 2008), protests (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002;
5

King & Soule, 2007), letter-writing campaigns (Smith & Cooper-Martin, 1997),
divestitures (Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995), and shareholder (proxy) resolutions
(Reid & Toffel, 2009; Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010). Yet scholars have
devoted scarce attention to empirically measuring the stock market’s reaction to
stakeholder-initiated civil lawsuits. This is surprising since stakeholder groups are
increasingly employing civil litigation as a central pillar of their anti-corporate campaigns
(Kurlantzick, 2004). Moreover, one of the few studies to examine corporate response to a
variety of stakeholder tactics including civil lawsuits found that they were more likely to
elicit concessions than any other tactic (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).
Given that corporate share price is a widely accepted benchmark for assessing
managerial performance, if the filing of civil lawsuits is associated with a loss of
shareholder wealth, then managers might have an incentive to engage with stakeholder
groups and settle these complaints before they result in litigation, or undertake corporate
citizenship initiatives (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) that might make the firm less of a
target in the first place. Conversely, if no relationship exists between the filing of these
lawsuits and corporate share price, firms might choose to ignore them and let the legal
process run its course. Either way, the question of whether secondary stakeholderinitiated litigation is related to corporate share price has great relevance for multinational
strategy.
This essay employed an event study methodology to investigate whether the filing
of civil lawsuits under the ATS are related to target firm stock price. Research was
gathered on all ATS lawsuits filed against MNEs from 1993 to 2010 using Lexis-Nexis
and Westlaw legal databases of Federal civil lawsuits. Daily stock price data was
6

collected from the CRSP database at the University of Chicago. The study controlled for
market-wide fluctuations in stock price returns which could occur for reasons unrelated to
the filing of the lawsuits.
Statistical analysis showed that lawsuit filings are significantly and negatively
related to target firm share prices during certain event windows. In addition, regression
analysis indicated that cases alleging labor violations are associated with a significant
loss of shareholder wealth, as are cases involving extractive companies. It was concluded
that given the current legal environment, firms with existing investments in developing
countries need to be vigilant about monitoring the activities and practices of their
overseas subsidiaries and business partners, while firms contemplating major investments
should think twice, as some potentially profitable opportunities may be so fraught with
risk that they do not merit the investment.
Essay 3: Is It Who They Are or What They Do? Understanding the Factors that Predict
Extractive Firm Vulnerability to Secondary Stakeholder-Initiated Human Rights
Litigation

Notwithstanding the recent interest amongst organizational scholars in secondary
stakeholder activism (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Gardberg & Newburry, 2010; King &
Soule, 2007), the question of why particular firms become targets of activist pressure
while others fly below the radar has only received limited attention in the management
literature (Whetten, Rands, & Godfrey, 2002).
Rowley and Moldoveneau (2003) have proposed that anti-corporate activists are
driven by two distinct sets of factors: interest-based motivations and identity-based

7

motivations. The former pertain to issues these groups hold to be important, including
conservation, social justice, and non-discrimination in the workplace. Identity-based
factors, by contrast, relate to the organizational imperative to foster solidarity and
collective identity. If stakeholder groups are driven primarily by interest-based
motivations, they might be expected to target companies in industries that generate
negative externalities such as air and water pollution, as well as specific firms perceived
to be negligent on social, environmental, and workplace issues. If driven primarily by
identity-based motivations, they might be expected to target companies for reasons
unrelated to their industry or social performance (Rowley & Moldoveneau, 2003). A
recent review of the empirical literature suggests that “both repeated wrong-doers and
larger and more visible firms are at a greater risk of stakeholder scrutiny,” thus lending
support for both interest-based and identity-based explanations (de Bakker & den Hond,
2008). Whether this holds true for stakeholder-initiated civil lawsuits, however, remains
an unanswered question.
We studied this question by examining lawsuits filed by NGOs against natural
resources firms under the ATS. We chose this industry because of its size and importance
to the global economy – in 2006, the world’s 39 largest publicly listed oil companies
generated nearly $2.8 trillion in revenue (Rangan & Barton, 2010) -- and because roughly
one-quarter of all the ATS lawsuits filed against MNEs have targeted firms engaged in
natural resource extraction or production (Drimmer & Lamorre, 2011).
Our results suggest that activist groups sometimes choose their corporate targets
with the aim of changing the practices of social performance laggards (i.e., based on what
they do). But they also indicate that some ATS lawsuits are targeted at highly profitable
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firms, irrespective of their social performance (i.e., based on who they are). It is possible
to infer from these results that stakeholder groups are motivated by both interest and
identity-based rationales in choosing corporate targets for ATS lawsuits – a finding that is
broadly consistent with past empirical research on stakeholder activism (den Hond & de
Bakker, 2007; Rehbein, Waddock & Graves, 2004).

Conceptual Model for the Three Essays
Figure 1 provides a conceptual diagram that links the three essays that comprise
this dissertation. The diagram, viewed from left to right, depicts the pathways of
influence and the hypothesized relationships between actors and variables. As can be
seen, Essay 3 postulates that secondary stakeholder groups, when considering the
universe of potential corporate targets for litigation-based adversarial campaigns, base
their decisions, at least in part, on four factors (H1 – H4). Essay 2 considers
consequences for firms of being targeted by ATS litigation and other stakeholder actions.
It predicts that the filing of ATS litigation will trigger a negative short-term stock market
reaction (H1), as investors adjust their portfolios in response to the news of the litigation.
The magnitude of the stock market’s reaction, it is further hypothesized, will be affected
by a series of firm and stakeholder factors (H2 – H6). Finally, Essay 1 provides an
integrative theoretical and conceptual framework for the three essays.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model for the Three Essays
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Contribution
This dissertation has relevance for theory, practice, and public policy. By
examining how an increasingly influential group of secondary stakeholders – human
rights activists – are using civil litigation and extra-legal tactics to press for concessions
from MNEs, we offer new insights into a phenomenon that has great salience for IB and
management scholars. Given the dearth of scholarly analysis on this topic in the core
management literature in comparison to other anti-corporate tactics such boycotts,
protests, and proxy resolutions, this work fills an important void.
In a broader sense, this research contributes to the scholarly effort to understand
how a range of relatively resource-poor, powerless, and marginalized groups (Gardberg
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& Newburry, 2010) are using “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) to challenge corporate policies
and practices, promote institutional change, and press for new and binding global norms
governing the conduct of international business. These groups include NGOs (Doh &
Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009), social movements (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008;
Soule, 2009), and transnational advocacy networks (Riesse et al., 1999). Meanwhile, by
identifying the factors that underlie the targeting decisions of NGOs initiating ATS legal
challenges against MNEs and empirically testing their impact on stock market
performance, this research addresses the gap in our knowledge of the motives and tactical
choices stakeholders make and their firm-level consequences (de Bakker & den Hond,
2008), thereby advancing stakeholder theory.
This research also has relevance for practice. Given the sharp rise in human-rights
related lawsuits against MNEs in recent years, managers need to have a better
understanding of the likelihood and costs (both direct and indirect) of litigation prior
entering new markets. Our principal findings that the filing of ATS lawsuits has a
significant and negative relationship to shareholder wealth and that stakeholder groups
select their targets for ATS litigation based in part on their social performance would
seem to provide a strong justification for multinational managers to seek ways to improve
their overseas business practices and stakeholder relations. Possible avenues for action
include pursuing dialogue with activists (Hart & Sharma, 2004), adopting voluntary
codes of conduct (Drimmer & Lamorree, 2011), joining private certification schemes
(Conroy, 2007; Vogel, 2008), embracing cross-sectoral partnerships with NGOs (Dahan
et al., 2010), and undertaking other corporate citizenship initiatives (Gardberg &
Fombrun, 2006).
11

From a policy standpoint, the sharp rise in foreign direct investment to emerging
markets in recent years has been heralded as a promising development in global
economic affairs (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). But if MNEs perceive the legal risks in these
markets to be too great, they may scale back their investments or withdraw entirely, with
grave consequences for local development. Moreover, the exit of Western MNEs from
countries with weak governing institutions could diminish Western strategic influence in
countries regarded as important partners in the struggle against international terrorism
(Shamir, 2004), and open the door to state-owned firms from emerging nations that are
less beholden to pressures from civil society and less committed to social responsibility
(Schrage, 2003).
This research suggests that the concerns of business and political leaders are
legitimate. But so too are the concerns of activist groups that have called attention to the
growing disparity in economic power between MNEs and their developing country hosts,
and the historic ability of these firms to influence (and sometimes subvert) local laws and
regulations while evading responsibility for grievous crimes committed on their behalf or
in their interests by sovereign governments. In the absence of a new and binding global
framework that spells out the specific social responsibilities and moral obligations of
MNEs operating in developing countries, private efforts by transnational activist
networks to hold them accountable for overseas rights abuses are bound to continue, with
major ramifications for firms that do international business, and the governments and
citizens of the nations where they do it.
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Essay I – Transnational Legal Activism: A New Form of Political Risk?

II. Abstract and Introduction
Business scholars have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social movements,
non-governmental organizations, and other secondary stakeholder groups attempt to
influence corporate policies and practices through confrontational tactics such as boycotts
and protests. Yet few efforts have been made to conceptualize the relationship between
social activists and the firms they seek to influence, and the mechanisms by which these
groups exert their influence remain poorly understood. This essay seeks to fill this gap by
examining how transnational networks of human rights activists have used extraterritorial
civil litigation and extra-legal activism to push for concessions from multinational
enterprises. Building upon stakeholder theory, international business theories of political
risk, and neo-institutional theories of social risk, we offer a new conceptualization.
Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
In his seminal book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), Albert O. Hirschman
theorized that when confronted with declining performance on the part of an entity with
which they have a relationship -- whether a business, government, or political party –
individuals and organizations chose to either withdraw from the relationship (i.e., exit),
attempt to repair it through communication or protest (i.e., voice), or remain quiescent
(i.e., loyalty). In recent years sociologists and organization scholars have invoked
Hirschman’s exit, voice, loyalty framework to explain how social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other relatively powerless groups use “voice”
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to influence corporate policies (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008) and promote
institutional change (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Rao, 2009).
Hirschman’s ideas have influenced the work of Baron (2001, 2003), who has
coined the term “private politics” to refer to social activism aimed directly at corporations
rather than channeled via the intermediary of the state (i.e., public politics). Examples of
private political activity include boycotts, protests, civil lawsuits, and shareholder (proxy)
resolutions,1 whereas lobbying legislators and regulators and seeking favorable judicial
interpretations represent public political activities (Baron, 2001, 2003; Reid & Toffel,
2009).2 While private political activity in the U.S. has a long history that dates back at
least to the Boston Tea Party,3 it has become increasingly common in recent years,
spurred by the growing economic power of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the

1

Pioneered by religious organizations, proxy resolutions are often initiated by activist groups who
buy enough shares of a company’s stock (the equivalent of $2,000) to initiate a vote on their
resolutions at annual shareholder meetings. An example is People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA), which has reportedly purchased shares in at least 80 companies in recent years,
including McDonald’s and Kraft Foods, in order to file proxy resolutions (Crumb, 2010).
2

Activist groups often pursue private and public political strategies simultaneously. A prime
example is the student-based Free Burma Coalition, which, during its heyday in the late 1990s,
combined anti-corporate activism, including protests, boycotts, and shareholder resolutions, with
appeals to local, state and federal governments for sanctions and selective purchasing laws (Spar
& LaMure, 2003).
3

As King (2009) observes, the Boston Tea Party was both a protest against Britain’s rule over its
North American colonies and a tactic designed to generate outrage about the East India Tea
Company, which was using its market power to drive smaller American rivals out of business.
The current era of private political activity directed against MNEs began with the boycott of
Nestle in the late 1970s over its sale of infant formula in developing countries (Davis, Morrill,
Rao, & Soule, 2008).
14

diminished ability of states to rein them in through regulation (King & Pearce, 2010), and
the proliferation of NGOs (Doh & Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009).4
NGOs have been defined as private, not-for-profit organizations that aim to serve
particular societal interests by focusing on advocacy and/or operational efforts on social,
political and economic goals, including equity, education, health, environmental
protection and human rights (Teegen et al., 2004). These groups pressure corporations to
meet their demands through “insider” and “outsider” strategies (Peterson, 1992). The
former involve efforts to influence decision makers directly, typically through moral
suasion; the latter, indirectly, by mobilizing public opinion (Peterson, 1992). Outsider
strategies often involve adversarial “market campaigns” that threaten (and deliver) harm
to corporate reputations and brands (Klein, 2000; Baron and Diermeier, 2007; O’Rourke,
2005). These market campaigns have grown in scope and sophistication in recent years
(Manheim, 2001; Drimmer, 2010), and now frequently transcend national borders,
creating new risks for MNEs (Spar & LaMure, 2003; Kobrin, 2005).
A case in point is the campaign waged against Chevron for alleged environmental
damage caused by Texaco (acquired by Chevron in 2001) during the nearly three decades
it operated a petroleum concession in Ecuador’s Oriente region.5 Spearheaded by the
Amazon Defense Fund (ADF), an Ecuadorian NGO that describes itself as “part of a

4

As Yaziji and Doh (2009) observe, the number of NGOs around the world has grown by 400
percent over the last decade, while mentions of NGOs in the Financial Times and the Wall Street
Journal have risen twenty-fold over this period.
5

Texaco subsidiary TexPet acquired the right to explore and drill for oil in Ecuador in 1964. It
operated as part of various consortia with private and state partners until 1992, when it sold its
assets to PetroEcuador, the state-owned oil company (Drimmer, 2010).
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regional, national, and global struggle for environmental and collective rights in the
Ecuadorian Amazon,” the campaign began in the early 1990s with a lawsuit filed in a
U.S. district court claiming violations of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) (Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc.), a law that permits non-U.S. citizens to sue corporations in U.S. federal
courts for overseas human rights violations (Davis, 2008).6 The lawsuit was filed on
behalf of 30,000 indigenous people from Ecuador by U.S. and foreign NGOs, public
interest attorneys, a Philadelphia-based class action law firm, and several Boston-based
law professors (Shamir, 2004). The plaintiffs claimed that Texaco improperly disposed of
toxic oil by-products, contaminating rivers and streams, and causing widespread illness.7
While the ATS lawsuit was dismissed by a U.S. court in 1996 under forum non
conveniens, a legal doctrine that requires a court to dismiss a case if a more appropriate
alternative forum exists, related charges were brought in Ecuador under local law. Years
of costly litigation ensued. Meanwhile, activists launched a multi-pronged grassroots
effort in the U.S. aimed at damaging the firm’s image with customers and investors. The
campaign, which continues to this day, has included a sophisticated media and public
relations effort built around a web-based portal (chevrontoxico.com) containing news
items, fact sheets, press kits, court documents, and multimedia clips, and an investor
outreach effort that has involved filing shareholder resolutions critical of the company’s

6

The ATS, part of the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789, states that “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
7

The Plaintiffs charged Texaco with dumping 18.5 billion gallons of “formation water” – leftover
water from the oil extraction process – into open pits that fed into waterways. The result was
massive ecological damage, elevated rates of cancer for local residents, and other health issues
(Kolker, 2006).
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environmental practices and direct appeals to large public pension funds urging them to
liquidate their Chevron stock.8 The activists achieved a stunning victory in 2011 when an
Ecuadorian court found the firm liable for $17 billion in damages – the largest-ever
award of its kind -- and ordered the MNE to pay an additional 10 percent of the value of
the compensatory damages (roughly $860 million) to the ADF.9
Another prominent case of private politics involves Canadian oil and gas producer
Talisman Energy, which was targeted by activists in the late 1990s after acquiring a
smaller Canadian firm with investments in Sudan (Manhas, 2007). Like the campaign
against Chevron, the centerpiece of Talisman campaign was a lawsuit: a $1 billion class
action lawsuit filed in a U.S. federal court charging the firm with complicity in genocide
and war crimes perpetrated by the Sudanese government against Christians and other
non-Muslim minorities (Kobrin, 2004). In addition to aiding the repressive regime in
Khartoum with royalties from an oil pipeline it helped operate, Talisman was accused of
providing fuel, vehicles, aircraft, and runways for the Sudanese military, which used
them to carry out bombing raids on civilians (Shamir, 2004). Other elements of the
divestment campaign, led by the American Anti-Slavery Group, a Boston-based NGO,
included boycotts, protests, and proxy resolutions. The campaign generated a barrage of
negative press and prompted large investment funds including TIAA-CREF, CALPERS,
8

A novel element of the anti-Chevron campaign is the feature-length documentary “Crude,”
produced by an independent filmmaker at the suggestion of one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, which
features interviews with villagers supposedly harmed by the firm’s environmental malpractice
and cameo appearances by celebrities such as musician Sting and his wife Trudi Styler (Drimmer,
2010).

9

Chevron has appealed the judgment, claiming that the ruling was the “product of fraud and
contrary to the legitimate scientific evidence” and filed a counter-lawsuit in the U.S. against the
plaintiffs’ attorneys for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) (Barrett, 2011).
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and the New York City Pension Fund to sell their Talisman shares. The U.S. Congress
also considered legislation that might have resulted in Talisman’s shares being delisted
from the New York Stock Exchange (Kobrin, 2004). Talisman ultimately succumbed to
pressure and sold off its Sudanese assets in late 2002, citing “shareholder fatigue”
(Manhas, 2007).
The campaigns against Chevron and Talisman, and others like them, suggest a
new dynamic in business-society relations, wherein activist groups are leveraging
resources and networks across countries and using both legal and extra-legal tactics to
pressure firms to divest from otherwise profitable ventures, alter their business practices,
and improve their social and environmental performance. In addition, some activist
groups appear bent on instigating sweeping institutional changes to entire industries
(Reid & Toffel, 2009) and establishing binding new global norms governing MNE
conduct in developing countries (Shamir, 2004). Tarrow (2005) refers to this as “the new
transnational activism,” which he sees as being driven by “rooted cosmopolitans” -individuals with local and international networks and resources that they use to advance
claims on behalf of external actors. In a similar vein, other scholars herald the emergence
of “transnational advocacy networks” (Risse et al., 1999), “transnational social
movements” (Smith et al., 1997), and “activism beyond borders” (Keck and Sikkink,
1998).
But to what extent is the emerging threat to international business (IB) posed by
these activist networks new and different from past threats that MNEs have confronted?
How should IB and Strategy scholars conceptualize this threat? And what are the risk
management implications? For Jones (2010), transnational legal activism of the kind
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practiced against Chevron and Talisman represents a “new form of political risk.” It is
“new” in the sense that it stems from changes in international legal norms that have made
MNEs potentially liable in the home country for the misconduct of foreign governments,
security forces, and even paramilitary organizations if it can be proven that the firm’s
managers knew about this misconduct or somehow benefitted from it (Davis, 2008). Yet
in other respects, this threat is not all that different from the types of challenges MNEs
operating in developing countries have faced for years. Indeed, Simon (1984), who put
forth an influential conceptual model of political risk, included unfavorable legal rulings
in the MNE’s home country within his model, categorizing these as “direct external
risks” to operations and profitability.10
Yet the political risk literature, by and large, focuses on governmental action (or
inaction) in the host country as the source of firm-level risk (Wells, 1998), whereas the
emerging threat of transnational legal activism emanates from NGOs typically domiciled
in the home country or in multiple countries. Indeed, as Kobrin (2005: 204-205) writes,
what drove Talisman from Sudan, “was not in-country risk: they managed a difficult
situation well… Rather, Talisman sold its Sudanese operations because of ‘political risks’
arising in North America from activists’ successful efforts to associate it with complicity
in human rights violations in Sudan.”
Yaziji (2005) offers a different label for this emerging threat: “social risk,” which
he defines as “exposure to possible loss or constraints on strategic choice resulting from

10

By contrast, unfavorable legal rulings in the host country, along with expropriations,
restrictions on remittances, wage and price controls, and other discriminatory actions represented
“direct-internal risks,” which emanate from the host government (Simon, 1984).
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normative delegitimation challenges by external organizations.” Drawing upon neoinstitutional theory (Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995), he calls attention to the indirect costs
to firms of stakeholder activism, which may include the loss of brand value, employee
morale, and legitimacy with key stakeholders. It is these costs, he argues, that ultimately
drive the managers of targeted firms to respond to the demands of activist groups, which
otherwise wouldn’t receive much attention.
But does either of these frameworks adequately explain the nature of the threat to
MNEs posed by transnational legal activism and the mechanisms by which such
influence is exerted? This essay argues that both frameworks offer important insights into
this emerging threat but that each ultimately falls short in key areas, thereby necessitating
new theorizing.
This paper proceeds as follows: First we review the literature on secondary
stakeholder activism. Next, we examine existing theories of political and social risk. We
then provide a brief overview of the ATS, followed by an analysis of the NGOs that have
pioneered its use and the legal and extra-legal tactics they routinely employ to gain
leverage over their corporate targets. We then put forth a new conceptual construct –
transnational legal risk – to explain the emerging threat to MNEs posed by these
networks and conclude with implications for theory and practice.
III. Literature Review
Numerous observers have noted that the once adversarial relationship between
NGOs and corporations appears to have evolved into a new and more complex
relationship that often involves elements of collaboration, dialogue, and partnership
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(Doh, Newburry, & Teegen, 2003; Rondinelli & London, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009).
One indicator of the new spirit of cooperation is the proliferation of cross-sectoral
partnerships like those forged between McDonald’s and the Environmental Defense Fund
to eliminate polystyrene packaging and reduce solid waste (Davis et al., 2008), and
Unilever and Oxfam International to reduce poverty and promote economic development
in Indonesia (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Research suggests that corporations and stakeholder
groups can both derive significant benefit from these partnerships. NGOs may obtain
financial and technical resources that enable them to better serve their members and
maximize their social impact, while firms may gain enhanced social legitimacy
(LaFrance & Lehaman, 2005), technical and legal expertise (Yaziji, 2004), and access to
new information about consumer trends that leads to innovative new products, services,
and business models (Dahan et al., 2010; Hart & Sharma, 2004; Yaziji, 2004).
And while cooperation between NGOs and corporations is on the rise,
confrontation remains a key leitmotif of the relationship – particularly when the NGO
possesses a radical, anti-corporate ideology (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Management
and organization researchers seeking to understand the interplay between activist groups
and corporations have recently employed stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) as a
theoretical lens (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). A stakeholder is “any group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s
objectives (Freeman, 1984: 46).” In contrast to the shareholder perspective, which views
profit maximization as the sole objective of the corporation (Friedman, 1962),
stakeholder theory views the economic goals of the corporation to be less important than
organizational survival, which can be enhanced by cultivating strong relationships with a
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wide array of groups with a stake in the corporation, including employees, customers,
suppliers, creditors, and communities, as well as shareholders (Soule, 2009).
Stakeholder theory accords NGOs and social movements the status of secondary
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). Unlike the primary stakeholders of the company (e.g.,
shareholders, workers, suppliers, and creditors), secondary stakeholders have no
contractual bond to the firms they seek to influence, little resource leverage, and are less
vital to organizational survival (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). In conceptual
terms, they are part of an outer ring of stakeholder “spokes” that encircle a “hub,” which
represents the firm. See Figure 2.
Figure 2: Stakeholder Conceptual Diagram

Given their peripheral status in relation to the firm and its primary stakeholders,
theory suggests that secondary stakeholders should attract little managerial attention and
22

have limited sway over corporate policy (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008). Indeed, Mitchell
and colleagues (1997: 875) liken these groups to “mosquitoes buzzing in the ears of
managers: irksome but not dangerous, bothersome, but not warranting more than passing
management attention.”
Yet we know that mangers not only pay attention to these secondary stakeholders,
they often meet their demands – sometimes incurring significant costs in the process. For
instance, PepsiCo, Disney, Levi Strauss, and Apple Computer, among others, bowed to
pressure from the student-based Free Burma Coalition in the 1990s and divested from
Burma (Myanmar) (Spar & LaMure, 2003); Nike capitulated to the United Students
Against Sweatshops and affiliated pressure groups and demanded that foreign suppliers
improve working conditions within their factories (Soule, 2009); Starkist conceded to the
Earth Island Institute’s (EEI) demands that it implement dolphin-safe fishing practices
throughout its foreign supply chain (Frooman, 1999); Trader Joe’s agreed under pressure
from Greenpeace to remove genetically modified products from its shelves (Frooman &
Murrell, 2005); Shell gave in to the demands of Greenpeace that it scuttle plans to
dispose of the Brent Spar oil platform at sea and spent $70 million to haul the rig to shore
for disassembly (Yaziji, 2004); and Aventis capitulated to Friends of the Earth and other
environmental NGOs, spending more than $500 million to buy back genetically modified
StarLink corn from growers (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Meanwhile, in 2001, Novartis
undertook a series of far-reaching social initiatives, including providing an anti-malaria
drug at cost to patients in the developing world before being targeted by NGOs – a move
that Spar and LaMure (2003) describe as “preemptive capitulation.”
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The success of secondary stakeholders in influencing corporate behavior has
stimulated a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature. One stream of research
focuses on stakeholder mobilization, and considers which groups are most likely to
engage in confrontational tactics such as boycotts (Gardberg & Newburry, 2010) and
shareholder resolutions (Profit & Spicer, 2006). Another stream focuses on firm response
to activism, examining the success of activists in winning concessions from target firms,
including the disclosure of information on greenhouse gas emissions (Reid & Toffel,
2009), improvements in social performance (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007),
enhancements to environmental practices (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Lenox & Eesley,
2009), and the addition of healthy items to restaurant menus (Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, &
Justice, 2008).
Yet another research stream examines the stock market’s reaction to different
stakeholder tactics including boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; Koku et al., 1997),
protests (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002; King & Soule, 2007), divestiture campaigns
(Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995; Meznar, Nigh, & Kwok, 1994), proxy resolutions
(Reid & Toffel, 2009; Doh et al., 2010), and a variety of tactics including civil lawsuits
(Eesley & Lenox, 2005). The evidence, by and large, suggests that these tactics typically
have only a modest impact on shareholder wealth (Spar & LaMure, 2003; Vogel, 2005).
A related body of work examines the mechanics by which secondary stakeholder
groups exert influence over corporate targets. An important contribution to this literature
is Frooman’s (1999) model of stakeholder influence. Drawing upon resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), he argues that stakeholder groups seeking to affect
firm behavior typically adopt one of four strategies: Withholding, usage, direct, and
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indirect. Withholding strategies involve restricting the supply of a critical resource to the
firm as a means of exerting leverage. Usage strategies involve attaching conditions (i.e.,
“strings”) to the continued supply of a critical resource. Direct influence strategies entail
directly manipulating the flow of critical resources. And indirect strategies involve using
third parties to influence resource flows to the firm. The choice of a strategy is largely
determined by the level of resource dependence (independence) that exists between the
stakeholder and the firm (Frooman, 1999).
Frooman and Murrell (2005) offer a modification of this typology. It involves two
types of “manipulation strategies” (coercion and compromise), and two types of
pathways (direct and indirect). In this model “withholding” represents a coercive
manipulation strategy, whereas “usage” a compromise manipulation strategy. Since
secondary stakeholder groups usually have few critical resources they can withhold (or
threaten to withhold) from the target firm, they typically opt for an indirect influence
strategy (Frooman, 1999), which involves appealing to an ally such as consumers or
shareholders, who in turn use their leverage with managers to press for change. The EII,
as Frooman explains, adopted an indirect strategy in its efforts to convince Starkist to
change its tuna procurement policies – it appealed to consumers through a savvy and
sophisticated media campaign that included grisly imagery of dolphins being trapped and
killed in the netting of fishing trawlers. The ensuing controversy pressured the firm to
demand changes in the highly efficient yet inhumane technique its foreign suppliers used
to catch tuna.
The models of stakeholder influence articulated by Frooman (1999) and Frooman
and Murrell (2005), are broadly consistent with that put forth by Yaziji (2005), who sees
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secondary stakeholders as exerting influence via “critical players” (i.e., primary
stakeholders), who in turn use their leverage with firm managers to push for change. We
next examine Yaziji’s model of social risk, compare it with political risk, and then
explore the conceptual fit between these frameworks and the emerging threat of
transnational legal activism.
IV. Theory Development
Social Risk
As previously mentioned, Yaziji (2005) characterizes social risk as threats to firm
performance stemming from attacks on the firm’s image and reputation by activist
groups. At the core of Yaziji’s model is the concept of “normative delegitimation.”
Rooted in the writings of Suchman (1995), Scott (2001), and other neo-institutional
theorists, normative delegitimation is the process by which an organization’s normative
legitimacy is diminished through challenges by outside organizations. These challenges
may take the form of boycotts, “brand bashing,” shareholder resolutions, and civil
lawsuits (Yaziji, 2005).
While some of these actions may impose direct financial costs on the firm, these
costs, Yaziji argues, are far less significant than the indirect costs, which may include the
loss of trust, confidence, and legitimacy with the critical players. It is concern about
damage to these “intangible assets” (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996) and
relationships which prompts the firm’s managers to respond to the activists. Their
response may involve initiating delegitimization efforts of their own against the activist
groups, issuing threats, extending invitations to negotiate, or adopting policy changes in
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line with the activists’ demands. The choice of response is mediated by the activists’
success in aligning (or failing to align) with the critical players’ interests and institutional
norms, the beneficence of the social and economic conditions, and the degree of success
of past challenges. Figure 3 provides a conceptual model of social risk based on Yaziji
(2005).
Figure 3: A Conceptual Model of Social Risk
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Political Risk
Social risk shares an affinity with political risk in that both streams of research
center on firm interactions with non-market players who can affect firm behavior and
performance (Yaziji, 2005). Yet social risk is a relatively new concept, whereas political
risk is well established in the IB and Strategy literatures (e.g., de la Torre & Neckar,
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1988; Kobrin, 1982; Simon, 1984; Oetzel, 2005; Wells, 1998). Although many different
definitions of political risk have been offered over the years, there is general agreement
that it arises from discontinuities in the firm’s political environment that are difficult to
anticipate and threaten its profitability, performance, operations, and/or strategy (Robock,
1971).
These discontinuities typically stem from the actions of host governments (Wells,
1998), although they can also emerge from actions taken by non-governmental actors in
the home, host, or international society (de la Torre & Neckar, 1988). Examples include
protests and strikes initiated by student groups and labor unions, attacks on company
property by guerrilla organizations and terrorist groups, and threats against corporate
personnel by criminal syndicates (Markwick, 1998). These discontinuities may also
emanate from government actions in the home country, such as when the executive or
legislative branches impose trade sanctions on “rogue nations,” or technology transfer
restrictions on particular industries (Simon, 1984). Figure 4 provides a conceptual model
of political risk based on Simon (1984).
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Figure 4: A Conceptual Model of the Political Risk
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Although political risk can have positive as well as negative consequences for
firms – an example of a positive consequence being a sudden change in government that
brings a business-friendly regime to power -- the literature focuses on the negative
consequences and the managerial strategies that can be adopted to anticipate and mitigate
these consequences (Kobrin, 1982). Following Robock (1971), some scholars distinguish
between micro (or sub-sovereign) and macro (or sovereign) political risks (Alon,
Gurumoorthy, Mitchell, & Steen, 2006; Alon & Herbert, 2009; Oetzel, 2005). The former
involve threats to select projects and firms, whereas the latter involve threats to many or
all projects, firms, and industries in a country.
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Social vs. Political Risk: Toward a Synthesis
As Yaziji (2005) observes, social risk is a close “phenomenal cousin” to political
risk. Yet important differences exist. Whereas social risk calls attention to the indirect
costs of activist pressures aimed at firms, political risk focuses on the direct costs of such
activity, which include the loss of ownership rights (e.g., through expropriation), or, more
commonly, operational losses stemming from government interference or discrimination
(Kobrin, 1982; Henisz & Zelner, 2004). Social and political risk also differ over what
they identify as the chief source of risk. In the case of political risk, it is typically (though
not always) the foreign host government, through its moves to seize assets, impose
currency controls, and change laws and regulations in ways that penalize MNEs (Wells,
1998). Social risk, by contrast, is exerted by non-governmental actors through
delegitimation campaigns directed at shareholders and public pension funds, customers,
the media, regulators, the courts, and the general public (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Finally,
firms manage these two types of risks in markedly different ways. Political risk is usually
managed during the pre-investment phase (Oetzel, 2005) through strategies such as
postponement, avoidance, joint ventures, hedging, and insurance (Rivoli & Salorio, 1996;
Wells, 1998), whereas social risk is managed both before and after investments are made,
through dialogue, partnerships, philanthropy, and other forms of stakeholder engagement
(Yaziji & Doh, 2009; Oetzel, Getz, & Ladek, 2007). Whether the emerging threat of
transnational legal activism represents a type of political or social risk is the question to
which we now turn our attention, following a brief survey of the NGOs that have
pioneered this new form of contestation and their legal tool of choice – the ATS.
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The ‘Human Rights Revolution,’ NGOs, and the Alien Tort Statute
Legal scholar Jeffrey Davis (2008) has referred to the recent efforts to hold
MNEs accountable in U.S. federal courts for alleged complicity in human rights abuses in
developing countries as a “human rights revolution.” This revolution is being driven by a
relatively small cadre of U.S.-based NGOs, based in New York and Washington, D.C.,
using the 200 year-old ATS as their primary legal vehicle.11
Originally drafted with an eye toward protecting diplomats and deterring piracy
on the high seas, the ATS lay dormant for nearly 200 years until invoked in the late 1970s
by a New York-based NGO serving as legal counsel for the family of a Paraguayan
citizen who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by a Paraguayan police inspector in
Paraguay who later immigrated to the U.S. While the case was initially dismissed by a
U.S. district court on jurisdictional grounds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the decision, ruling that torture and extra-judicial killing constitute
violations of the “law of nations” and are thus actionable under ATS. The judge awarded
the plaintiffs $10 million in punitive damages, stimulating new interest in the law as a
vehicle for prosecuting crimes against humanity committed on foreign soil (Davis, 2008;
Gallagher, 2010).
Subsequent ATS lawsuits targeted prominent political figures including Ferdinand
Marcos of the Philippines, and in the mid-1990s, a U.S. federal court ruled that non-state

11

The list of NGOs includes the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), Earth Rights
International (ERI), International Rights Advocates (IRA), and the International Labor Rights
Fund (ILRF). These groups typically draw on the support of public interest attorneys and
sometimes work in tandem with private law firms (Drimmer, 2010).
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actors, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, could be prosecuted for war
crimes and other rights abuses.12 Shortly thereafter, two NGOs -- the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) and Earth Rights International (ERI) -- filed a landmark case
on behalf of villagers in Myanmar (Burma) against the U.S. oil and gas company Unocal
and its senior executives (Doe v. Unocal). The claims included complicity in forced
labor, torture, rape, extra-judicial killings, and other crimes committed by the Burmese
military against civilians as part of a $1.2 billion natural gas pipeline project in which the
company had a minority stake (Holzmeyer, 2009; Schoen, Falchek, & Hogan, 2005).
Unlike previous ATS cases involving corporate defendants, this one survived motions to
dismiss, suggesting that U.S. courts viewed the American legal system as the appropriate
forum for claims involving serious rights abuses committed by foreign governments and
militaries, and the theories of “vicarious corporate liability” upon which these claims
rested (Davis, 2008; Shamir, 2004).13
Since Doe v. Unocal, plaintiffs have filed dozens of ATS cases against U.S. and
foreign-headquartered MNEs over alleged misconduct in some 60 different countries
(Drimmer, 2010).14 High-profile ATS cases have involved allegations of facilitating

12

The case against Bosnian Serb General Radovan Karadzic (i.e., Kadic v Karadzic) for crimes
against humanity was particularly important since Karadzic, who headed an illegitimate
government not recognized by the international community, was a private individual rather than a
state actor. As Goldhaber (2010) observes, “creative plaintiffs soon concluded that alien tort also
applies to non-state actors like corporations that violated the law of nations.”

13

Unocal later won summary judgment in 2000 based on the court’s finding that it had neither
participated in nor influenced the Burmese military’s conduct, however, that ruling was
overturned on appeal in 2002, setting the stage for a jury trial. The case was settled prior to trial
in 2004 for a reported $30 million (Davis, 2008).

14

Under U.S. law, litigation can only proceed against a corporate defendant where it maintains
certain “minimum contacts with the forum.” However, U.S. courts have tended to interpret this
principle broadly, conferring jurisdiction in cases where the foreign company had no substantial
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genocide in Sudan, aiding and abetting atrocities committed by the Apartheid government
in South Africa, manufacturing the chemical herbicides used by the U.S. military in the
Vietnam War, and conducting non-consensual medical trials on children in Nigeria
(Shamir, 2004). Among the MNEs that have been sued under ATS in recent years are
Chevron Corp., Royal Dutch/Shell, ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, Talisman
Energy, Rio Tinto PLC, Chiquita, Bridgestone, Nestle, Coca-Cola, IBM, Pfizer, Yahoo,
and Wal-Mart (Gallagher, 2010).
Although no MNE has yet been found liable in an ATS case that has gone to trial,
a number of cases have survived dismissal motions and entered the discovery phase,
requiring firms to devote significant resources to legal defense (Kropf, 2010). Some of
these cases have lingered in the court system for over a decade, generating negative
publicity and tarnishing the reputations of the corporate defendants and their chief
officers (Dunst, 2010). Numerous corporate ATS cases have also been settled out of court
for large sums,15 and two cases involving MNEs have made it to trial.16 Some legal

U.S. presence, but was listed on a major U.S. stock exchange or maintained a U.S. investor
relations office (Drimmer, 2010).
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At least 17 ATS cases involving corporations have been settled over the past 15 years. The list
includes the so-called “Nazi gold” lawsuits of the late 1990s, which secured $1.25 billion in
compensation from Swiss banks for victims of the Holocaust and the case against Unocal in
Burma (reportedly between $30 and $60 million). Other major settlements include those
involving U.S. apparel and retail companies for allegations related to sweatshop labor in Saipan
($20 million), Royal Dutch Shell for alleged human rights violations in the Niger Delta ($15.5
million), and Yahoo! Inc. for divulging private information on political dissidents to the Chinese
government (undisclosed amount) (Goldhaber, 2010).

16

One of these cases (Bowoto v. Chevron) alleged that Chevron was complicit in the Nigerian
military’s violent crackdown against unarmed protesters at one of the company’s offshore oil
platforms. The other case (Romero v. Drummond Co.) was based on accusations that the
Drummond Company conspired with Colombian paramilitary organizations to murder union
leaders at one of its coal mines (Kropf, 2010).
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analysts believe it is just a matter of time before a defendant is found liable, which would
presumably incentivize new cases (Drimmer, 2010).

NGOs as Transnational Advocacy Networks
While the human rights NGOs that have initiated much of the recent ATS
litigation against MNEs typically have small staffs and modest budgets, they extend their
reach and maximize their impact by operating as “transnational advocacy networks”
(Risse et al., 1999), drawing upon the support of individuals and organizations
throughout the world. Such networks are characterized by “shared values and by dense
exchanges of information and services” (Sikkink, 1993). Key constituents of
transnational human rights networks include NGOs and labor unions at home and abroad,
grassroots community activists, academics, individual public interest attorneys, and even
attorneys with large corporate law firms that offer pro-bono services (Davis, 2008).
ERI is a good example of an organization that functions as a transnational
advocacy network. One of the two NGOs that served as legal counsel to the plaintiffs in
the Doe v. Unocal case, ERI maintains a permanent staff of fewer than two dozen
attorneys and administrators in Washington, D.C., with an annual budget of less than $2
million. Yet its global network of alliances and partnerships is extensive. The network
includes an overseas branch in Chaing Mai, Thailand, which oversees the organization’s
activities in Burma and Southeast Asia, partnerships with leading U.S. and European
human rights NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, Global
Witness, and Amnesty International through the International Corporate Accountability
Roundtable (ICAR), and relationships with an array of NGOs and grassroots groups
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throughout the developing world. Meanwhile, ERI maintains tight links with foreign
attorneys through initiatives like the Mekong Legal Advocacy Institute, a forum for
lawyers in South East Asia to network and “develop new legal and advocacy strategies,
and take effective coordinated actions to protect the environment and human rights”
(earthrights.org).
The importance of this extended network to ERI’s success was recently
underscored by the organization’s executive director: “Making sure that local NGOs are
involved is of the utmost importance, because lawyers in D.C. aren’t going to know how
to go into the pipeline region of Burma and gather evidence that the government doesn’t
want gathered and not put themselves and others in danger. In many of these (ATS)
cases, just for pure logistics, you have to have local people who know what a human
rights abuse is and know how to document it in a way that’s reliable” (Davis, 2008: 83).
ERI also participates in organizations such as Publish What You Pay, a global
civil society coalition that claims to help citizens of developing countries hold their
governments accountable for the management of revenues derived from natural resource
projects, Save the Mekong, ESCR-Net, Network for Human Rights Documentation –
Burma, and The True Cost of Chevron, an initiative comprising some 40 NGOs from 20
countries or U.S. states, including Amazon Watch, Global Exchange, Greenpeace, the
Rainforest Action Network, and Public Citizen. The initiative describes itself as “a
unique collaboration of indigenous, native, and First Nation communities and their allies
resisting the destructive human rights and environmental policies of Chevron and the
entire oil industry” (earthrights.org).
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Extra-Legal Activism
In addition to their legal advocacy efforts, human rights NGOs often engage in
extra-legal activism, purportedly to pressure firms to settle these lawsuits on terms
favorable to the plaintiffs and gain leverage in the legal proceedings. As Drimmer (2010)
observes, these out-of-court tactics cluster into four categories: media-related activities,
community organizing activities, investment-related activities, and political advocacy
activities.
Media-related activities include creating websites to showcase news about the
case and mobilize support and donations, authoring opinion-editorials in newspapers,
granting media interviews, staging press conferences to coincide with key events such as
the filing of new litigation, and filming mini-documentaries (and sometimes full-length
films) about the cases; community organizing activities involve organizing protests and
boycotts of the goods and services of target firms; investment-related activities include
introducing proxy resolutions at shareholder meetings, pressuring institutional investors
to divest from the target company, and contacting the Securities and Exchange
Commission to initiate investigations; and political advocacy activities include testifying
at Congressional hearings (Drimmer, 2010).
ERI, which has filed ATS cases against Unocal, Occidental Petroleum, Chiquita,
Chevron, Union Carbide, and Shell in recent years, engages in a wide variety of extralegal tactics. In the context of its campaign against Unocal for its investment in Burma,
ERI has published reports critical of the company’s activities, written letters to Chevron
senior executives accusing the company of supporting repression, and published antiChevron opinion-editorials in international newspapers. It also has organized events to
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promote “Total Denial,” a documentary by an independent filmmaker about the Unocal
case. The anti-Chevron campaign continues to this day, notwithstanding the fact that the
legal case was settled in 2004 (earthrights.org).
International Rights Advocates (IRA) is another U.S.-based human rights NGO
that engages in extensive extra-legal tactics in support of its ATS litigation. In concert
with an ATS lawsuit it filed against Coca-Cola for alleged complicity in repression
against union leaders at a Colombian bottling facility (Sinaltrainal v. The Coca-Cola
Company), IRA launched the “Killer Coke” campaign, a multi-pronged grassroots effort
designed to “hold The Coca-Cola Company, its bottlers and subsidiaries accountable and
to end the gruesome cycle of violence and collaboration with paramilitary thugs,
particularly in Colombia” (killercoke.org). The site contains visceral imagery including
mock Coca-Cola ads with captions such as “Murder: It’s the Real Thing,” and exhorts
activists to demonstrate, leaflet, and write letters to the offices of Coke’s Board of
Directors (killercoke.org). While the legal effort against Coca-Cola has yet to bear fruit,
the activist campaign has produced results: In 2006 TIAA-CREF sold 1.2 million shares
of Coca-Cola stock, worth over $50 million, from its Social Choice Fund. The move
followed the decision of KLD Analytics to remove the firm from its Broad Market Social
Index (BMSI) list of socially responsible firms, in part because of allegations of human
rights violations in Colombia (Mankowski, 2006).

V. Discussion
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Transnational Legal Risk: A New and Unique Threat to MNEs?
The foregoing analysis suggests that human rights NGOs are operating on two
tracks simultaneously – the legal track, in which they seek to obtain favorable
dispensations in the courtroom or lucrative financial settlements, and the activist track, in
which they seek to harm the target firm’s image and reputation as a means of gaining
leverage over the firm and winning concessions. From the perspective of the target firm,
the first of these tracks resembles political risk in the sense that it exposes the firm to
direct financial costs in the form of legal fees, court costs, and public relations
expenditures, while diverting managerial time and attention away from running the
organization. Such maneuvers also expose the firm to the possibility of substantial out-ofcourt settlements and billion-dollar judgments.
The second track, however, resembles social risk in the sense that it raises the
prospect of indirect financial harm to the firm through damage to its image, reputation,
and ultimately the loss of legitimacy. The potential costs of such reputational damage
include the loss of customers, clients, employees, investors, and suppliers, as firms
distance themselves from the target and withhold critical resources. An additional cost to
the firm is the heightened possibility of regulatory action. Given that neither the social or
political risk frameworks adequately capture the essence of this new and increasingly
salient threat to MNE operations, we believe it merits a new label: “transnational legal
risk.” We define this as the risk to a firm’s performance and reputation caused by
transnational networks of human rights activists employing legal and/or extra-legal
tactics in the home country to win concessions. Table 1 compares key aspects of
transnational risk with political and social risk.
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Table 1: Political, Social and Transnational Legal Risk – Key Aspects
Political risk

Social risk

Transnational legal risk

Focus

government interference
– primarily in the host
country

NGO and social
movement activism –
primarily in the home
country

NGO and social movement
activism – in both the host
and home countries

Tactics

-expropriation

-shareholder resolutions

-civil litigation
(extraterritorial)

-f/x controls

-boycotts

-taxation

-protests

-restrictions on profit
remittances

-letter-writing campaigns

-shareholder resolutions
-boycotts
-protests
-civil litigation
-letter-writing campaigns

-local content
requirements
-export performance
requirements
Costs

direct

indirect (damage to
image, reputation, and
legitimacy)

direct (legal, pr expenses)
and indirect (damage to
image, reputation,
legitimacy)

Nature of
influence

direct (govt to MNE)

indirect (NGO to MNE
via “critical players”)

direct and indirect

Risk management

-avoidance

-avoidance

-avoidance

-postponement

-cross-sectoral
partnerships

-cross-sectoral partnerships
-CSR initiatives

-joint ventures
-CSR initiatives

-community relations

-lobbying
-community relations
-insurance
-hedging
-diversification
Theme

building barriers around
the firm (insulation)

breaking down barriers
(engagement)
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breaking down barriers
(engagement)

VI. Conclusion
As de Bakker & den Hond (2008) recently observed, despite more than 25 years
of research on stakeholder theory since Freeman’s seminal (1984) contribution, scholars
know relatively little about the mechanisms by which external agents influence
organizational behavior. This research helps fill this gap by examining how an
increasingly influential group of secondary stakeholders – human rights activists – are
using civil litigation and extra-legal tactics to press for concessions from MNEs. Given
the growing importance of civil litigation to the efforts of NGOs and the relative dearth
of scholarly analysis on this topic in the management literature in comparison to other
anti-corporate tactics such as boycotts, protests, and proxy resolutions, this research fills
an important void.
In a broader sense, this research contributes to the scholarly effort to understand
how a range of relatively resource-poor and powerless groups including NGOs (Doh &
Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009), social movements (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008;
Soule, 2009), and transnational advocacy networks (Riesse et al., 1999) are seeking to
change corporate policies and practices, promote institutional change, and press for new
and binding global norms governing the conduct of international business. Moreover, by
offering insights into the ways in which MNEs conceptualize and manage threats to their
tangible and intangible assets, this research contributes to the literatures on political and
social risk and the non-market strategies of firms (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Bonardi,
Hillman, & Keim, 2005). This research also draws attention to the social and moral
ramifications of MNE behavior in the developing world – an issue that has been
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identified as one of high importance for IB researchers (Ricart, Enright, and Ghemawat,
2004).
Beyond its theoretical contributions, this research has relevance for practice. As
Frooman (1999) observes, knowing how stakeholders may try to influence a firm is
critical knowledge for any manager since strategic planning and action presupposes some
understanding of how organizations in their environment will act and react. By offering
insights into the different tactics that activist stakeholder groups employ -- both inside
and outside of the courtroom -- this research contributes to that endeavor.
An important conclusion of this research is that firms targeted with human rightsrelated litigation need to take into account both the direct and the indirect costs of these
lawsuits – the latter of which include image damage, loss of brand equity, and diminished
social legitimacy. Moreover, they need to realize that such challenges are more than a
legal fight – they are a battle for the hearts and minds of stakeholders (Garcia & Ewing,
2008). Or, stated differently, they are “public relations and political wars” with the
courtroom battle being just one theater in a wider war (Garcia & Ewing, 2008). As such,
MNEs should approach these challenges in a very different way than they would other
types of litigation. Elements of an effective counter-strategy, as Garcia and Ewing (2008)
observe, include acting quickly to disclose all relevant information about the allegations
“before the media frenzy begins,” crafting a simple message that can be understood by a
variety of audiences (e.g., legal, public, and policy), communicating it forcefully, and
mobilizing allies and using them to “tell the story” – in a word, many of the same extralegal techniques that the claimants have used so effectively against corporations.
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It has been suggested that firms facing class-action lawsuits brought by private
(non-corporate) plaintiffs ought to litigate these cases, while settling those brought by
other firms, since the latter have a higher probability of success and are viewed by the
markets as more threatening (Koku, 2006). And while it is true that no private plaintiff
has yet prevailed in a corporate ATS case that has gone to trial (Drimmer, 2010), such
advice ignores the exceptionally high reputational risks associated with ATS claims,
which, after all, involve allegations of complicity in genocide, murder, torture, rape, and
other heinous acts. Moreover, the tendency for these cases to linger in the court system
for years, owing to lengthy motion practice, discovery, appeals, and frequent reversals of
lower court rulings by appellate courts, only magnifies the potential impact. The case
against Royal Dutch Shell for its alleged complicity in the 1995 execution of Ogoni
human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian military is a case in point. That
litigation, which attracted an international outcry and became a cause célèbre amongst
activists, dragged on for 13 years, blighting the company’s otherwise positive reputation
on social issues.17 The parties ultimately agreed to a $15.5 million settlement on the eve
of the trial in 2009, although in many respects the damage had already been done (Dunst,
2009). In this case, and many others, the defendant clearly would have been better off
opting for mediation or a settlement earlier in the game.

17

In 2009 activists groups, including PLATFORM, Oil Change International, and Friends of the
Earth launched the “Shell Guilty” campaign, which included the release of reports critical of the
firm’s activities in the Niger Delta, protests, and international press conferences. These and other
groups also initiated a media campaign, “Remember Ken Saro-Wiwa? Shell Would Rather You
Didn’t,” that included the placement of full page anti-Shell advertisements in major UK
newspapers (anitaroddick.com, 2010).
42

While this research does not directly address the question of what strategies
MNEs can take to reduce their vulnerability to ATS litigation, some implications can be
drawn. First, companies can enhance their due diligence, by adopting codes of conduct,
carefully screening potential business partners, and hiring third parties to monitor the
compliance of these partners with company codes (Drimmer & Millerwise Dyck, 2009).
Beyond these steps, MNEs can adopt one of three strategies, which we label avoidance,
resistance, and engagement.
Avoidance involves steering clear of countries with repressive governments, weak
institutions, and chronic human and labor rights violations. And indeed, anecdotal
evidence suggests that some companies – particularly small and medium-size firms -- are
thinking twice about investing in certain high risk countries due to concerns about legal
liability.18 But given the importance of emerging markets to the business strategies of
MNEs (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), and the fact that ATS cases have been brought against
firms operating in over 60 countries including some of the world’s largest and fastestgrowing markets (e.g., China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa), avoidance would seem
to be a questionable strategy.
Resistance involves undertaking efforts to oppose the application of ATS to
corporations, while attempting to delegitimize or co-opt the groups behind these lawsuits
(Shamir, 2004). To this end, MNEs have conducted a vigorous lobbying effort in
Washington aimed at convincing policymakers to repeal or amend the statute. The
campaign has been spearheaded by business groups such as USA*Engage, the National
18

Davis (2008: 238) quotes an interview with a senior U.S. State Department lawyer who
remarked: “ In a certain number of instances small and medium size businesses their risk advisors
are telling them not to go in conflictive situations simply because…. of the legal fees of
defending (against ATS lawsuits).”
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Foreign Trade Council, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Council for
International Business, and the Organization for International Investment (Davis, 2008).
These groups have also filed friend of the court (amicus) briefs with district courts urging
them to drop these cases and petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to settle the matter of
“corporate liability” once and for all. Their efforts appeared to bear fruit in 2004 when
the high court took up an ATS-related case (Sosa v. Alvarez Machain), but the court’s
ruling that the door should remain open to corporate ATS lawsuits “subject to vigilant
door-keeping” was hardly the result the business community had sought (Shamir, 2004).
Meanwhile, a July 2011 ruling by a federal appeals court overturning a lower court’s
decision in favor of Exxon Mobil in a 2001 ATS case brought by Indonesian plaintiffs
over claims of murder, torture, and other atrocities has raised speculation that the
Supreme Court will again address this matter, yet how the justices will rule is anyone’s
guess (Stempel, 2011b).
Engagement, in our view, is the most promising strategic approach to ATS
vulnerability. It involves pursuing dialogue with activists (Hart & Sharma, 2004; Yaziji,
2004), seeking mediation (Rees, 2010), and embracing corporate citizenship initiatives
(Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006), including voluntary codes of conduct, private certification
schemes, and philanthropic support for community education, health, and environmental
projects. While there are obvious financial costs to an engagement strategy and no
evidence that such a strategy reduces the risk of being targeted by activists, there are huge
potential benefits. These include enhanced trust, confidence, and goodwill from local
communities, greater legitimacy, and a more robust “social license” to operate
(Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004). Firms adopting an engagement strategy in
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developing countries may realize other benefits too, including better employee
recruitment and retention, increased sales, reduced insurance risk premiums, and
improved relations with host governments and other stakeholders, thereby leading to a
sustainable, long-term competitive advantage (Oetzel et al., 2007).
An example of a firm that has adopted an engagement strategy is France’s La
Farge Group, the world’s second-largest cement-maker. Among the many different
countries in which Lafarge operates is Indonesia, where it has a plant in the city of Banda
Aceh, located in the restive northern province of Aceh, Sumatra. Aware of the “liability
of foreigness” associated with being a Western company in the world’s largest Muslim
nation, Lafarge has actively looked for ways to enhance its social legitimacy. It perceived
an opportunity following the December 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami, which devastated
the area, killing nearly one-third of its local workers and contractors (Lafarge, 2005). In
much the same way that Wal-Mart responded to Hurricane Katrina, Lafarge quickly
mobilized workers and resources to assist local community groups with relief and
reconstruction. In the months that followed the disaster it built over 300 houses, set up
clinics, restaurants, and schools, purchased school supplies, and even renovated mosques
(Lafarge, 2005). The result, as Kapstein (2006) observes, is that “Lafarge is widely
appreciated in Banda Aceh, and harming its plant or people in any way would not make
good political sense for those who wish to make a statement.” Similarly, we might
presume that the idea of filing an ATS lawsuit against the company would gain little
traction within the local community – notwithstanding the fact that ATS lawsuits have
been filed against other Western MNEs operating in Indonesia, including Exxon Mobil
and Freeport McMoran.
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Finally, this research has relevance for public policy. The sharp rise in ATS
lawsuits against MNEs in recent years and the size of the damages sought has raised
concerns amongst policymakers that foreign direct investment -- an important engine of
global economic growth -- could be curtailed (Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007). Indeed,
Hufbauer (2009) warns that the growing tide of ATS litigation could “chill investment in
non-OECD countries,” slowing economic growth and increasing human suffering in
countries that account for over 5 billion people and half the world economy. Moreover,
Hufbauer and Mitrokostas (2004) estimate that $55 billion in U.S. foreign direct
investment (FDI) could be deterred by ATS lawsuits, jeopardizing some $10 billion in
U.S. exports and 80,000 manufacturing jobs. Concerns over ATS liability could also
discourage foreign-based MNEs from investing in the U.S., costing thousands of
additional American jobs (Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, 2004).
Business and political leaders also warn that the exit of Western MNEs from
emerging nations in Africa and Southeast Asia owing to legal concerns could diminish
Western strategic influence in countries seen as important partners in the struggle against
international terrorism, while opening the door to investment by state-owned firms from
emerging nations that are less beholden to pressures from civil society and less
committed to social responsibility (Schrage, 2003). Indeed, when Talisman Energy
divested from an oil pipeline project in the Sudan in 2003 amidst intense stakeholder
pressure, India’s state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited purchased its assets.
The project continues to this day, but without the community development projects and
transparency initiatives that Talisman claims it had implemented (Manhas, 2007).
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This research suggests that the concerns of business and political leaders are
legitimate. But so too are the concerns of activist groups that have called attention to the
growing disparity in economic power between MNEs and their developing country hosts,
and the historic ability of these firms to influence (and sometimes subvert) local laws and
regulations while evading responsibility for grievous crimes committed on their behalf or
in their interests by sovereign governments and their security forces. In the absence of a
new and binding global framework that spells out the specific social responsibilities and
moral obligations of MNEs operating in developing countries, private efforts by
transnational activist networks to hold them accountable for overseas rights abuses are
bound to continue, with major ramifications for firms that do international business, and
the governments and citizens of the nations where they do it.
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Essay II: Secondary Stakeholder Legal Action and Stock Market Performance: An Event
Study of Alien Tort Statue Litigation Filed Against Multinational Enterprises: 1993-2010

VII. Abstract and Introduction
Secondary stakeholder groups have filed dozens of civil lawsuits in U.S. federal courts
against multinational enterprises in recent years over alleged human rights abuses, labor
violations, and environmental crimes in developing countries. Multinational business
leaders complain that these lawsuits add to their cost of doing business and hamper their
global competiveness. Anecdotal evidence suggests that their concerns may be justified.
But does the empirical evidence bear this out? To answer this question we conducted an
event study of lawsuits filed against multinational enterprises between 1993 and 2010
under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, a law that gives U.S. federal courts extraterritorial
jurisdiction for cases involving allegations of serious offenses committed against foreign
citizens. Our analysis shows that target firms experienced a significant decline in share
price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit had a significant and
negative relationship to shareholder wealth. We offer conclusions and implications for
practice.
The rise of anti-corporate activism represents a challenge to international
management theory and practice. Although a rich stream of international business (IB)
and management literature exists on non-market threats to the multinational firm
(Chambers, Wernick, Zdanowicz, & Von Glinow, 2010; Grosse, 2005; Henisz,
Mansfield, & Von Glinow, 2010), this literature tends to focus on political risks to
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investors emanating from the acts of host governments (Kobrin, 1979; de la Torre &
Neckar, 1988), and the opportunistic policy decisions these sovereign entities often take
(Henisz & Zelner, 2010). For many multinational firms today, however, the biggest nonmarket threat they face comes not from governments abroad, but from individuals and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) domiciled in the home country, or from
networks of activists spanning multiple countries (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005;
Doh & Teegen, 2003).
By launching boycotts and protests and filing shareholder resolutions and civil
lawsuits, these activist groups damage corporate reputations, tarnish brands, and
undermine the firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Soule, 2009; Spar & La Mure,
2003; Yazjij, 2005). Companies stigmatized as poor corporate citizens may also
experience difficulty recruiting and retaining employees, customers, and suppliers, and
raising investment capital (David et al., 2007; Turban & Greening, 1997). Given the
stakes, it is no surprise that multinational enterprises (MNEs) have responded to the
threat of being “named and shamed” by devoting increasing attention and resources to
social risk identification (Yaziji & Doh, 2009), stakeholder management (Hillman &
Keim, 2001), and corporate citizenship initiatives (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006).19
Management and organization researchers seeking to understand the interplay
between activist groups and corporations have recently employed stakeholder theory
(Freeman, 1984) as a theoretical lens (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Stakeholder
19

Corporate citizenship refers to the range of socioeconomic activities that companies undertake
to fulfill perceived duties as members of society. Examples include charitable giving, pro bono
activities, volunteerism, and support for community educational, health, and environmental
programs (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006).
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theory accords social activists the status of “secondary stakeholders,” which, unlike
primary stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, suppliers, and creditors), are not
vital to organizational survival (Clarkson, 1995). As such, these groups should attract
little managerial attention (Mitchell et al., 1997). Yet the empirical literature suggests that
managers often do pay careful attention to the demands of these secondary stakeholders
and sometimes make significant concessions (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008). This
reality has stimulated new research that examines when and why these groups mobilize
(Rowley & Moldoveneau, 2003; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), how they select their
targets (Rehbein et al., 2004; Hendry, 2006; Lenox & Eesley, 2009), the different
influence strategies they employ (Frooman, 1999; Frooman & Murrell, 2005), and the
factors that influence firm response (Spar & LaMure, 2002; Reid & Toffel, 2009).
Researchers have also analyzed the shareholder wealth implications of common
stakeholder tactics such as boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; King, 2008), protests
(Epstein & Schnietz, 2002; King & Soule, 2007), letter-writing campaigns (Smith &
Cooper-Martin, 1997), divestitures (Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995), and proxy
resolutions (Reid & Toffel, 2009; Doh et al., 2010).
What is surprising, however, is that scholars have devoted scarce attention to
empirically measuring the stock market’s reaction to the filing of civil lawsuits by
stakeholder groups. This is surprising because stakeholder groups are increasingly
employing civil litigation as a central pillar of their anti-corporate campaigns
(Kurlantzick, 2004). Moreover, one of the few studies to examine corporate response to a
variety of stakeholder tactics including protests and boycotts found that civil suits were
more likely to elicit concessions than any other tactic (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).
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Given that corporate share price is a widely accepted benchmark for assessing
managerial performance (Lambert & Larker, 1987), if the filing of civil lawsuits is
associated with a loss of shareholder wealth, then managers might have an incentive to
engage with stakeholder groups and settle these complaints before they result in litigation
(e.g. through mediation), or undertake measures that would make their firms and senior
executives less of a target in the first place. Such measures might include adopting
voluntary codes of conduct, participating in private certification programs (Vogel, 2008),
or engaging in multi-sectoral partnerships (Dahan et al., 2010). Many MNEs have
established such alliances in recent years and claim to be benefiting from them (Kourala
& Laasonen, 2010). Conversely, if there is no relationship between the filing of these
lawsuits and corporate share price, firms might choose to ignore them and let the legal
process run its course – in much the same way that managers of boycotted firms have
often paid them little attention.20 Either way, the question of whether and how secondary
stakeholder-initiated litigation affects corporate share price has great relevance for
multinational strategy.
The U.S. Legal Environment and Transnational Tort Litigation
The U.S. has been dubbed the “litigious society” (Baye, Kovenock, & de Vries,
2005). Indeed, trial attorneys in America generate almost $50 billion per year in revenue
through tort litigation — more than the annual revenues of Microsoft and Intel, and
double the global sales of Coca-Cola (Center for Legal Policy, 2010). In recent years the

20

Procter & Gamble’s chairman, for example, refused to acquiesce to boycotters’ demands in the
early 1990s that his company cease from purchasing coffee beans from El Salvador -- the
revenues from which were claimed to be financing right-wing death squads -- because he knew
the action would have little or no financial impact (Koku, Akhigbe, & Springer, 1997).
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proliferation of class-action lawsuits, which permit one or more parties to sue (or be
sued) on behalf of all those who are similarly situated, has further increased the legal
burden companies face, with multi-billion dollar settlements occurring in cases involving
tobacco, silicone breast implants, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, and the diet
supplement Fen-Phen, while others related to fast food, lead paint, firearms, Chinese dry
wall, and asbestos may be on the horizon.
Although many different types of civil litigation are on the rise, the growth of
transnational tort litigation has been particularly noteworthy (Drimmer, 2010). These
cases involve allegations of personal or environmental harms stemming from corporate
misconduct overseas. While some transnational tort cases deal with fairly mundane issues
such as personal injury claims and allegations of negligent business practices, a growing
number involve allegations of complicity in serious overseas human and labor rights
abuses and environmental crimes. The primary vehicle for these lawsuits in the U.S. is
the ATS, a controversial law that allows foreign citizens to sue government officials,
private individuals, and corporations in U.S. federal courts for particular violations of
international law or a treaty of the U.S. (Davis, 2008).
Originally drafted with an eye toward protecting diplomats and deterring piracy
on the high seas, the ATS lay dormant for nearly 200 years until invoked in the late 1970s
by a New York-based non-governmental organization (NGO) serving as legal counsel for
the family of a Paraguayan citizen who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by a
Paraguayan police inspector in Paraguay who later immigrated to the U.S. (Kobrin,
2005). While the case was initially dismissed by a U.S. district court on jurisdictional
grounds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision, ruling
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that torture and extra-judicial killing constitute violations of the “law of nations” and are
thus actionable under ATS. The judge awarded the plaintiffs $10 million in punitive
damages, stimulating new interest in the law as a vehicle for prosecuting crimes against
humanity committed on foreign soil (Davis, 2008; Gallagher, 2010).
Subsequent ATS lawsuits targeted prominent political figures including former
Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and in the mid-1990s, a U.S. federal court ruled
that non-state actors, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, could be prosecuted
for war crimes and other rights abuses.21 Shortly thereafter, two NGOs -- the Center for
Constitutional Rights and Earth Rights International -- filed a landmark case on behalf of
villagers in Myanmar (Burma) against the U.S. oil and gas company Unocal and its
senior executives (Doe v. Unocal). The claims included complicity in forced labor,
torture, rape, extra-judicial killings, and other crimes committed by the Burmese military
against civilians as part of a $1.2 billion natural gas pipeline project in which the
company had a minority stake (Holzmeyer, 2009; Schoen, Falchek, & Hogan, 2005).
Unlike previous ATS cases involving corporate defendants, this one survived motions to
dismiss, suggesting that U.S. courts viewed the American legal system as the appropriate
forum for adjudicating claims of serious rights abuses committed by foreign governments
and militaries, and the theories of “vicarious corporate liability” upon which these claims
rested (Davis, 2008; Shamir, 2004).22

21

The case against Bosnian Serb General Radovan Karadzic (i.e., Kadic v Karadzic) for crimes
against humanity was particularly important since Karadzic, who headed an illegitimate
government not recognized by the international community, was a private individual rather than a
state actor. As Goldhaber (2010) observes, “creative plaintiffs soon concluded that alien tort also
applies to non-state actors like corporations that violated the law of nations.”

22

Unocal later won summary judgment in 2000 based on the court’s finding that it had neither
participated in nor influenced the Burmese military’s conduct, however, that ruling was
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Since Doe v. Unocal, plaintiffs have filed dozens of ATS cases against U.S. and
foreign-headquartered MNEs over alleged misconduct in some 60 different countries
(Drimmer, 2010).23 High-profile ATS cases have involved allegations of facilitating
genocide in Sudan, aiding and abetting atrocities committed by the Apartheid government
in South Africa, manufacturing the chemical herbicides used by the U.S. military in the
Vietnam War, and conducting non-consensual medical trials on children in Nigeria
(Shamir, 2010). Among the MNEs that have been sued under ATS in recent years are
Chevron Corp., Royal Dutch/Shell, ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, Talisman
Energy, Rio Tinto PLC, Chiquita, Bridgestone, Nestle, Coca-Cola, IBM, Pfizer, Yahoo,
and Wal-Mart (Gallagher, 2010).
Although no multinational corporate defendant has yet been found liable in an
ATS case that has gone to trial, a number of cases have survived dismissal motions and
entered the discovery phase, requiring firms to devote significant resources to legal
defense (Williams & Conley, 2007; Kropf, 2010). Some of these cases have lingered in
the court system for over a decade, generating negative publicity and tarnishing the
reputations of the corporate defendants and their chief officers (Dunst, 2010). Numerous
corporate ATS cases have also been settled out of court for large sums,24 and two cases
overturned on appeal in 2002, setting the stage for a jury trial. The case was settled prior to trial
in 2004 for a reported $30 million (Davis, 2008).
23

Under U.S. law, litigation can only proceed against a corporate defendant where it maintains
certain “minimum contacts with the forum.” However, U.S. courts have tended to interpret this
principle broadly, conferring jurisdiction in cases where the foreign company had no substantial
U.S. presence, but was listed on a major U.S. stock exchange or maintained a U.S. investor
relations office (Drimmer, 2010).

24

At least 17 ATS cases involving corporations have been settled over the past 15 years. The list
includes the so-called “Nazi gold” lawsuits of the late 1990s, which secured $1.25 billion in
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involving MNEs have made it to trial.25 Some legal analysts believe it is just a matter of
time before a defendant is found liable, which would presumably incentivize new cases
(Drimmer, 2010).
The U.S. business community has been an outspoken critic of ATS and has
mobilized to defeat it through lobbying and legal action (Shamir, 2004). Business
organizations such as the National Foreign Trade Council and USA*Engage contend that
the rising tide of ATS litigation represents a “unique but significant risk” to companies
with a substantial U.S. presence, saddling them with heavy legal fees and putting them at
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors in the international marketplace
(Williams & Conley, 2007). Business advocates and analysts warn that American MNEs
might respond to the rising tide of transnational tort litigation by retrenching from
developing countries, with grave consequences for the U.S. economy,26 and the
economies of host countries.
U.S. government officials, meanwhile, warn that the exit of Western MNEs from
fragile democracies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East owing to escalating legal risk
compensation from Swiss banks for victims of the Holocaust and the case against Unocal in
Burma (reportedly between $30 and $60 million). Other major settlements include those
involving U.S. apparel and retail companies for allegations related to sweatshop labor in Saipan
($20 million), Royal Dutch Shell for alleged human rights violations in the Niger Delta ($15.5
million), and Yahoo! Inc. for divulging private information on political dissidents to the Chinese
government (undisclosed amount) (Goldhaber, 2010).
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One of these cases (Bowoto v. Chevron) alleged that Chevron was complicit in the Nigerian
military’s violent crackdown against unarmed protesters at one of the company’s offshore oil
platforms. The other case (Romero v. Drummond Co.) was based on accusations that the
Drummond Company conspired with Colombian paramilitary organizations to murder union
leaders at one of its coal mines (Kropf, 2010).

26

Hufbauer and Mitrokostas (2004) estimate that $55 billion in U.S. foreign direct investment
(FDI) could be deterred by ATS lawsuits, jeopardizing some $10 billion in U.S. exports and
80,000 manufacturing jobs. Additionally, concerns over ATS liability could discourage foreignbased MNEs from investing in the U.S., costing thousands of additional American jobs.
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could have major U.S. foreign policy implications (Shamir, 2004). It could diminish
Western strategic influence in countries regarded as important partners in the struggle
against international terrorism, while opening the door to investment by state-owned
firms from emerging nations that are less beholden to pressures from civil society groups
(Schrage, 2003).27
But are the concerns of U.S. business and government leaders justified? Are the
costs to corporations associated with defending themselves against transnational tort
litigation indeed substantial? If so, according to the efficient market hypothesis (Fama,
1970), we might expect the market to discount a firm’s stock price at the initiation of
such litigation, in the absence of contemporaneous market-moving events, since the
hypothesis holds that current prices of assets in the market reflect all available
information about that asset. To date, no study has examined this question, although it
has important implications for corporate strategy and public policy.
The objective of this study is to determine whether a relationship exists between
the filing of ATS lawsuits and corporate share price. Given the proliferation of ATS
lawsuits against corporations in recent years and the expectations that they will continue
in the future,28 it is important to know whether the filing of new lawsuits is negatively
27

Indeed, when Talisman Energy divested from an oil pipeline project in the Sudan in 2003
amidst intense stakeholder pressure, India’s state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited
purchased its assets. The project continues to this day, but without the community development
projects and transparency initiatives that Talisman claims it had implemented (Manhas, 2007).
28
Numerous observers have predicted that ATS will become the next “litigation bonanza” for trial
attorneys (Drimmer, 2010). And while an October 2010 ruling by the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals that exempts corporations from liability for human rights abuses under ATS caused some
to speculate about the imminent demise of this type of legal challenge (Goldhaber, 2010),
subsequent decisions in other federal districts have affirmed the principle of corporate liability.
Meanwhile, new ATS cases continue to be filed on a regular basis. In May 2001, for instance, an
ATS case against Cisco Systems was filed in a California Federal District Court by an NGO on
behalf of members of Falun Gong, claiming that Cisco helped design a firewall used by the
Chinese government to censor the Internet and track political dissidents (Markoff, 2011). That
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associated with shareholder wealth and the magnitude of this relationship, if any.
Empirical data of this sort may prove valuable to corporate decision makers
contemplating overseas investments -- particularly in countries run by military
governments, beset by war or ethnic conflict, or where violations of internationally
recognized human and labor rights are commonplace.
If the majority of ATS suits are baseless, as suggested by corporate executives in
interviews, congressional testimony, and court briefs (e.g., Drimmer, 2010; Fergenson &
Merrigan, 2007), then the market’s reaction to them should be insignificant. Thus, claims
that such lawsuits impose excessive costs, risks, and burdens on business could be treated
with a high dose of skepticism. If it can be demonstrated, however, that the
announcement of these lawsuits does trigger an immediate and significant decline in
shareholder wealth, then MNE managers would have an incentive to undertake measures
that could preempt such lawsuits, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs
and initiatives.29 After all, research has shown that firms adopting CSR initiatives prior to
tactical attacks by activist groups can buffer themselves from potential criticism (Baron
2001; Baron & Diermeier, 2007).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on corporate lawsuits and financial markets. Section 3 puts forth hypotheses
informed by this literature. Section 4 discusses our data and methodology. Section 5
same month a California Federal Appeals Court revived a previously dismissed ATS lawsuit
against DaimlerChrysler claiming the company was liable for abetting human rights abuses
committed by Argentina’s military dictatorship during the “Dirty War” of the 1970s (Stempel,
2011a).
29

On the other hand, evidence of a litigation-share price link could encourage MNEs to redouble
lobbying efforts to oppose such challenges and discredit the groups behind them (Shamir, 2004),
make symbolic changes to policy while maintaining “business as usual” (David et al., 2007), or to
divest from politically unstable countries (Hufbauer, 2009).
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examines our results. And Section 6 offers discussion, conclusions, and directions for
future research.

VIII. Literature Review
Business researchers have long been interested in the question of whether and
how legal disputes involving corporations affect company performance and shareholder
wealth. An early study by Banks & Kinney (1982) examined the market’s reaction to
footnote disclosures of pending lawsuits. They found that there was indeed a negative
reaction to such disclosures. Frost (1991) corroborated these findings in a study using a
larger sample size over a different time period. Bhagat, Brickley, & Coles (1994)
examined the market’s reaction to lawsuits between corporations filed between 1981 and
1983. They found that defendant firms lost about one percent of their equity upon filing.
Karpoff and Lott (1993) found that corporate defendants accused of fraud and anti-trust
violations suffer significant wealth losses when the accusations were announced. The
authors also found that criminal restitution, civil penalty, and court costs accounted for
less than 10 percent of the shareholder wealth loss, and that the vast majority was due to
reputational damage.
While analyses of the market’s reaction to litigation between companies abound,
research on the impact of civil lawsuits brought by private citizens against corporations is
limited. Unlike inter-firm lawsuits, which primarily involve patent infringements and
contract disputes, most lawsuits between individuals and corporations involve allegations
of personal harms resulting from corporate negligence or misconduct (i.e., tort cases).
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In one of the few studies to consider these issues, Bhagat, Bizjak, & Coles (1998)
examined how lawsuits filed by governments, firms, and private citizens variously affect
corporate share price. They observed that defendant firms experienced an average wealth
loss upon filing of about 1% of market value of equity, or roughly $16 million. Wealth
destruction was largest for lawsuits filed by governments (-1.73%), and smallest for those
filed by other firms (-0.75%); suits brought by private parties resulted in a loss of equity
of -0.81%. In explaining their results, the authors hypothesized that governments have
more leverage and resources at their disposal than other parties, and thus are seen by
investors as more likely to prevail in a court battle. They also speculated that lawsuits
filed by government agencies (e.g., environmental suits) may have more serious financial
consequences for firms than other types of litigation (e.g., breach of contract). By
contrast, Koku, Qureshi, & Akhigbe (2001) found that lawsuits brought by individuals
against corporate defendants had no significant wealth effect, although those against
other firms did. This finding led the authors to conclude that firms should settle inter-firm
lawsuits while litigating non-interfirm suits.
Koku (2006) found a difference in the way that the market responds to classaction and non-class action lawsuits. While investors tend to react negatively to the
stocks of defendants in both cases, the reaction to class-action suits tends to be of a
greater magnitude and occurs over a larger event window. Gande and Lewis (2009) too
found significantly negative stock price reactions to shareholder-initiated class-action
lawsuits.
Although the empirical evidence is far from conclusive, it does suggest that
corporations typically experience a loss of shareholder value upon the filing of lawsuits
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against them, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a government, a corporation, or a
private individual. Whether the filing of ATS lawsuits against MNEs by private plaintiffs
results in the loss of shareholder wealth, however, remains an unanswered question. It is
to this question that we now turn our attention.

IX. Hypotheses
In the next section we develop a series of hypotheses on how the filing of ATS
lawsuits may be related to firm stock market performance. These hypotheses consider
characteristics of the firms targeted by litigation, the stakeholder groups that initiate
them, and the nature of the lawsuits themselves.

1. Negative Market Reaction - Since most of the corporate ATS cases filed to date have
been dismissed by federal courts on jurisdictional grounds, and the few that have made it
to trial have resulted in verdicts for the defense, it is possible that the financial markets
discount these lawsuits as insignificant events initiated by fringe activist groups and
“global ambulance chasers” (Goldhaber, 2008). On the other hand, it is possible that
market players do view the filing of ATS lawsuits as important occurrences that cloud a
firm’s financial prospects. After all, these cases typically involve allegations of
complicity in grave human rights abuses and may generate serious reputational harms for
defendant firms – especially since these legal cases are increasingly accompanied by
sophisticated media campaigns designed to vilify the company (Manheim, 2001;
Drimmer, 2010). Companies facing ATS litigation may need to take steps to publicize
their side of the story and defend their reputations, including mobilizing public relations
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and crisis management teams and launching media campaigns -- all of which may come
at a significant cost to the firm.
In addition to the possible image costs of ATS litigation for defendant firms, there
are financial costs associated with either settling the cases or contesting them in court.
Since ATS cases involve complex legal theories and arcane constitutional questions, they
are typically expensive to litigate, requiring extensive preparation by in-house counsel or
private attorneys. In the event that cases survive pretrial motions for dismissal or
summary judgment and move into the discovery phase, legal costs escalate dramatically,
as discovery may require extensive overseas travel and investigation, the deposing of
foreign witnesses, the procurement of documents from foreign governments and
militaries and their translation into English, and the hiring of expert witnesses in foreign
and international law (Kropf, 2010). Defendants may also be compelled by the courts to
provide public access to internal documents, emails, and other materials as part of the
discovery process that are time-consuming to collect and may prove embarrassing to
corporate officers (Baue, 2007).30 While defendants may prevail in lower courts, these
rulings are subject to appeals and reversals, raising the prospect of protracted legal battles
and escalating court costs.
The case of Talisman Energy in Sudan illustrates the arduous and costly path that
ATS litigation can take. The firm, a large, Canadian independent oil and gas producer,
was targeted in November 2001 with a $1 billion class action lawsuit for alleged
complicity in genocide and war crimes perpetrated by the Sudanese government against
30

Davis (2008: 291) recounts an interview he conducted with ERI litigator Richard Herz who
explained how a damning piece of evidence against Unocal was uncovered during the course of
discovery: “We got an email where the Unocal guy says to the Total guy, ‘we have no
responsibility to control what the military does. We have our responsibility and they have theirs –
let’s just admit there’s a grey area.’”
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Christians and non-Muslim minorities (Kobrin, 2004). In addition to aiding the repressive
regime in Khartoum via royalties from an oil pipeline it helped operate as a minority
partner in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNOPC), Talisman was
accused of providing fuel, vehicles, aircraft, and runways for the Sudanese military,
which used them to carry out bombing raids on civilians (Shamir, 2004). The legal case
against Talisman was but one facet of a larger divestment campaign that included
boycotts, protests, and shareholder resolutions. Spearheaded by the American AntiSlavery Group, a Boston-based NGO, the campaign generated a barrage of negative press
and prompted large investment funds including TIAA-CREF, CALPERS, and the New
York City Pension Fund to sell their Talisman shares. The U.S. Congress also considered
legislation that might have resulted in Talisman’s shares being delisted from the New
York Stock Exchange (Kobrin, 2004).
Talisman ultimately sold off its Sudanese assets in late 2002, citing “shareholder
fatigue,” but this did not end its legal ordeal. In March 2003 a federal district judge
denied Talisman’s request for dismissal, ruling that the case could proceed. Several more
years of litigation ensued. In 2006, a district court granted summary judgment for
Talisman, seemingly vindicating the company. But plaintiffs promptly appealed the
ruling, initiating a new round of litigation. The appeals court upheld the dismissal in
2009, but the plaintiffs have since filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court, which
may yet take up the case. The case against Royal Dutch/Shell for its alleged complicity in
the execution of Ogoni human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken SaroWiwa by Nigeria’s military followed a similar trajectory, marked by dismissals and
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reversals, and ultimately culminating in a $15.5 million settlement on the eve of the trial
some 13 years after the initial lawsuit was filed.31
Beyond the reputational damage and legal costs, defendants in ATS cases face the
possibility of sizable compensatory and punitive damages in the event that a jury finds it
liable. This is not an idle threat given the sympathy American juries have shown toward
individual plaintiffs in non-ATS tort cases (Koku et al., 2001) and ATS cases involving
private individuals and government defendants. Indeed, in 1995 a U.S. jury awarded
Filipino citizens nearly $2 billion in damages in an ATS case against the estate of former
dictator Ferdinand Marcos (Latham & Watkins, 2010). Plaintiffs may also attempt to
recover attorneys’ fees and seek the disgorgement of profits, further adding to the
potential legal liability that defendant firms face (Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007).
Even if these efforts fail, MNEs facing litigation may experience higher insurance
premiums and higher costs of capital (Frynas, 2004), and in some cases, the loss of
customers, as illustrated by a Danish energy firm’s recent announcement that it was
halting coal purchases from Drummond Co. pending the resolution of a case involving
alleged complicity in the murder by right-wing paramilitaries of labor activists at one of
its mines in Colombia (Cooper, 2006). Finally, allegations of grave and systematic abuses
may invite unwanted attention from policymakers and result in regulatory sanctions that
negatively impact future cash flows (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).
Thus, it is possible that market players will view the filing of an ATS lawsuit
against a corporation as bad news that will diminish firm value by diverting resources

31

As Goldhaber (2009) observes, it is quite likely that Royal Dutch Shell spent significantly more
in fees to its legal counsel than it did on the settlement, and that it would have spent more again
on the trial and subsequent appeals.
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from productive activities to litigation and public relations, driving up operating costs,
and chasing away customers and investors. Financial markets might also surmise that the
reputational damage associated with these suits could adversely affect the firm’s ability to
raise money on capital markets and attract and retain top managerial talent, triggering a
decline in future earnings expectations.

H1 – News of the initial filing of an ATS lawsuit against a firm will result in a negative
stock market reaction.

2. Industry: It has been shown that investors react to sudden and unexpected market
events by penalizing firms in industries associated with these events. For instance, in the
aftermath of the anti-globalization protests that derailed the 1999 WTO global trade
negotiations, investors sold shares in firms in industries considered to be
“environmentally damaging” (i.e., mining, steel, chemical, pulp and paper, and energy)
and “labor abusing” (i.e., toys, apparel, and footwear) (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002).
Investor reaction appears to have been motivated by concerns that the success of these
protests might trigger a wave of anti-business regulation or consumer boycotts against
firms in these industries. A similar logic could apply to the filing of ATS lawsuits;
investors might presume that firms in industries targeted most often by this type of
litigation could be harmed in the future by stricter regulation or a consumer backlash.
Although firms from a wide variety of industries, including chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, financial services, telecommunications, agriculture, and food and
beverages, have been sued under ATS in recent years, those involved in petroleum and

64

gas exploration and mining (i.e., extractive companies) and heavy construction have been
the most frequent targets (Kropf, 2010). This may be because extractive companies and
the firms that help build the infrastructure for their projects typically have limited choices
about where they can invest -- they must go where the natural resources are. Since these
resources are often buried beneath the soil in developing countries run by authoritarian
regimes or torn by strife and internal conflict, MNEs involved in the extraction and
production of natural resources may be particularly vulnerable to ATS litigation (Kaeb,
2008).
Furthermore, since MNEs seeking to exploit mineral resources in foreign
countries must often partner with state-owned enterprises as a condition of entry and hire
government security forces to police these projects, and these security forces typically
have little human rights training, extractive MNEs may be disproportionately exposed to
ATS litigation (Drimmer, 2010). Finally, since extractive firms and their construction
industry affiliates are typically held in low regard by the public, and seen in some
quarters as exploitative and corrupt, investors might determine that these firms would be
unsympathetic defendants in the event that a case goes to a jury trial (Kropf, 2010),
leading them to anticipate declines in future cash flows, thereby adversely affecting
corporate share price.

H2 – Lawsuits against extractive companies will have a larger negative impact than
those against non-extractive firms.
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3. Reputation for Social Responsibility – There is a large and growing management
literature that examines the link between a firm’s commitment to social responsibility,
broadly understood as discretionary activities designed to improve social conditions
(Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007), and its financial performance (Godfrey, Merrill, &
Hansen, 2009). A primary aim of this literature is to determine whether firms regarded as
socially responsible, based on evaluations of third-party entities,32 are more profitable
than their less socially- and environmentally-minded peers. Although debates rage over
the methodologies and measures used in these studies, the consensus is that “virtuous”
firms do tend to perform better over time than their non virtuous counterparts (Doh et al.,
2010; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), and may also
generate enhanced support from consumers, employees, and investors (Waddock &
Graves, 1997), thereby laying the foundation for sustained competitive advantage (Hill &
Keim, 2001).
While the idea that a reputation for social responsibility can serve as a source of
economic value has gained currency, few researchers have examined the social
responsibility-financial performance link in the face of organizational uncertainty and
crisis. Does having a reputation for social responsibility preserve shareholder wealth in
the event of a negative reputation event, such as a legal challenge by secondary
stakeholder groups? It is possible that it does. After all, past empirical research has shown
that a reputation for social responsibility can buffer a firm from external financial and

32

A variety of third-party entities publish CSR and corporate citizenship rankings. The list
includes journals (e.g., Fortune and Business Ethics magazines), mutual funds, private
companies, and non-profit organizations. The two most widely used social indices are the Domini
social index, created by KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., and the Calvert social index, created by
Calvert Investments (Doh et al., 2010).
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political turbulence. Jones, Jones & Little (2000) found that firms with a high score on
Fortune’s Most Admired Companies survey experienced smaller declines in shareholder
value during the stock market crash of 1989 than did those without, while Schnietz &
Epstein (2005) reported that firms with a reputation for social responsibility experienced
proportionately smaller losses in shareholder value in the aftermath of the failed 1999
WTO talks.
These and other studies examining the risk management ramifications of social
responsibility initiatives (e.g., Love & Kraatz, 2009; Doh et al., 2010) suggest that a
reputation for social responsibility may serve as a source of “moral capital” (Godfrey,
2005) or “reservoir of goodwill” (Jones et al., 2000) in times of crisis, providing
“insurance-like protections” (Godfrey et al., 2009), and cushioning the firm from
potentially negative outcomes. A reputation for social responsibility may also facilitate a
firm’s return to normalcy after a negative event, thereby serving as a source of
organizational resilience (Beer, 2009; Sheffi, 2005). As such, we expect that investors
will perceive the securities of MNEs with reputations for social responsibility to be less
risky than those of firms without such reputations, and that these virtuous firms in turn
will experience a smaller adverse market reaction upon the filing of ATS lawsuits. We
thus propose:

H3 – Firms with reputations for social responsibility will experience a smaller negative
stock market reaction upon the filing of an ATS lawsuit than firms without such
reputations.
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4. Identity of Plaintiff’s Legal Representation – Theory suggests that managerial attention
to stakeholder demands is conditioned by the group’s salience, as defined by its power,
legitimacy, and the urgency of its demands (Mitchell et al., 1997). It is logical that
investors would be swayed by these attributes as well in assessing the potential threat a
lawsuit poses to future earnings. While NGOs and other secondary stakeholder groups
have little or no resource leverage over focal firms and hence little power (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Frooman, 1999), they often have high legitimacy in the eyes of the public
(Yaziji, 2004; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Legitimacy has been defined as social acceptance
resulting from adherence to social norms and expectations (Deephouse & Carter, 2005),
and it is reasonable to presume that lawsuits filed by groups with high levels of
legitimacy would carry more weight with investors than those filed exclusively by groups
with low legitimacy, such as trial attorneys, who are renowned for being unscrupulous
and opportunistic.33 After all, litigation initiated by high legitimacy groups are likely to
be seen as more credible by the primary stakeholders of the firm (e.g., customers,
employees, suppliers) as well as by the media and government regulators, which may
increase the economic and reputational risks associated with these lawsuits.
NGOs have other assets that may give them an advantage over private firms in
civil litigation, including dense networks of relationships with individuals and advocacy
groups both domestically and abroad (Rowley & Berman, 2000; Doh, Newburry, &

33

In practice, NGOs and private law firms often work together on ATS cases, along with public
interest lawyers. For example, the ATS case against Texaco (Aguinda v. Texaco) was filed on
behalf of members of three indigenous tribes from Ecaudor by an Ecuadorean attorney based in
the U.S., and American class action law firm, a group of Boston-based law professors, and U.S.
and foreign NGOs, including the Massachusetts Environmental Law Society, Earth Justice
International, and Amazon Watch (Shamir, 2004).
68

Teegen, 2003). These networks may facilitate the gathering of evidence required to
prosecute a successful court case (Davis, 2008). NGOs may also have dedicated legal
staffs with extensive knowledge of human rights law and experience litigating ATS cases
as well as connections to other NGOs will similar resources and capabilities, and these
resources may facilitate the development of successful legal cases (Davis, 2008).
Moreover, since NGOs tend to draw people who are morally engaged and committed to
the principles their organizations stand for (della Porta & Mario, 1999), NGOs may be
more willing than private firms to pursue cases that take years to develop and are unlikely
to result in favorable verdicts or lucrative settlements. Finally, since NGOs typically have
limited resources, they tend to be highly selective about the legal cases they take on, and
this selectivity may result in more successful litigation (Davis, 2008).

H4 – ATS lawsuits filed with NGO support will have a larger the negative stock market
reaction than those filed exclusively by private law firms.

5. Nature of Claims – In addition to paying attention to the identity of the stakeholder
group mounting the anti-corporate challenge and the legitimacy they possess, theory
suggests that managers consider the nature of the claims being brought against the target
firm, with those related to issues affecting primary stakeholders having greater urgency
than those involving issues of concern to more distant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997;
Clarkson, 1995; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Given that workers are a stakeholder group
critical to organizational survival and financial performance, one might presume that
investors, like managers, would view lawsuits alleging overseas labor violations as a
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particularly serious economic threat. In fact, it is possible that investors would view
labor-related lawsuits as an even greater threat than lawsuits alleging more serious human
rights crimes, including kidnapping, torture, and murder, perpetrated against nonworkers. After all, a broad public consensus appears to have developed in the U.S. in the
wake of the NGO-led anti-sweatshop campaigns of the 1990s, that companies have a
moral responsibility for the treatment of workers in foreign factories, even when these
workers are employed by subcontractor firms (Soule, 2009; Spar & LaMure, 2003). No
such consensus appears to yet exist over corporate obligations with respect to the
environment and the treatment of more distant stakeholders (e.g., protestors). It is also
possible that investors view labor-oriented lawsuits as a prelude to other anti-corporate
activities that may negatively affect firm financial performance such as protests, boycotts,
and strikes (King & Soule, 2007). Based on this, we propose the following:

H5 – ATS lawsuits premised on labor violations will generate a larger negative stock
market reaction than those premised on non-labor issues.

6. Number of Defendants – Theory suggests that certain stakeholder actions are more
threatening to firms than others because they signal to investors that the public no longer
trusts the company (King & Soule, 2007). Such a lack of trust, or loss of legitimacy, may
undermine the company in its dealings with consumers, employees, suppliers, and
investors, thereby causing market players to anticipate a future loss in cash flow
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996). One possible indicator of threat with
respect to civil litigation is the number of corporate defendants named in the lawsuit.

70

Although many ATS lawsuits name a single corporate defendant, others target two or
more firms, and a few -- including those related to Apartheid-era crimes in South Africa - involve more than two dozen firms and damage claims in the billions of dollars
(Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007). And while the resources that can be marshaled by
multiple corporate defendants are likely greater than those available to a single corporate
defendant, giving these defendants an edge in a protracted legal dispute, most ATS cases
to date have been either dismissed or settled prior to a trial, thereby negating some of
these resource-based advantages. In short term, it is likely that the extensive negative
media attention these multi-defendant lawsuits tend to generate, and the possibility of a
costly settlement, will harm investor sentiment toward target companies and depress their
share price. We therefore propose:

H6 – ATS lawsuits involving multiple corporate defendants will generate a larger
negative stock market reaction to each defendant than those involving a single corporate
defendant.

X. Methodology

Data Collection Technique
The sample for this study is drawn from a variety of data sources. Information on
all ATS lawsuits involving MNEs between 1993 and 2010 was gathered using the
LexisNexis and Westlaw legal databases. We selected 1993 as the start date for our study
since a landmark ATS lawsuit was filed that year by Ecuadorian plaintiffs with the
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assistance of NGOs against Texaco for alleged human rights violations and
environmental crimes committed during its nearly three decades of operations in the
Ecuadorian Amazon (Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.).34
Our legal research was supplemented by searching business news abstracts in
Bloomberg Law, Lexis-Nexis, and ProQuest for articles about the filing of civil lawsuits
against corporations published in the major international business press (e.g., The Wall
Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Financial Times) and wire services (e.g.,
Bloomberg, Dow Jones, Reuters, and the Associated Press). Keywords searches were
conducted using terms such as “alien tort,” “civil litigation,” “lawsuit,” “human rights,”
and individual company names, obtaining information on ATS lawsuits involving 141
multinational corporate defendants. Thus, our initial sample consisted of 141 events. This
was reduced to 102 events after eliminating privately held corporations, companies not
listed on a major U.S. stock exchange, and firms with gaps in their market data.
Following the methodology used in past event studies (e.g., Godfrey et al., 2009;
Schnietz & Epstein, 2005), we also screened for possible confounding events such as
announcements of earnings, new products, and mergers and acquisitions occurring 3
weeks before the time news of the lawsuit became public, eliminating 6 additional cases.
Our final sample consists of 92 cases involving 67 MNEs. See Appendix A for a
list of the cases, defendants, and filing dates. Our sample includes firms cited as
defendants in large class-action lawsuits involving dozens of multinational companies
such as the South African Apartheid litigation (Khulamani v. Barclay’s National Bank

34

While the Aguinda ATS case was dismissed by a U.S. court in 1993, related charges were
brought in Ecuador under Ecuadoran law, and in 2011 an Ecuadorian court found Chevron
(which acquired Texaco in 2001) liable for $17 billion in damages (Carroll & Gullo, 2011).
72

Ltd.), as well as cases involving a single corporate defendant (e.g., Pfizer v. Adbullahi).
Our sample also includes several companies that had more than one ATS lawsuit filed
against them during the time series (e.g., The Coca-Cola Company, Dow Chemical,
Chiquita, and Occidental Petroleum). The size of the firms in our sample ranges from a
market cap of $126 million (Cutter & Buck) to $396 billion (Exxon Mobil). The average
market cap is $60.19 billion. Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics and correlations
for all independent variables.

TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

MCap

61

Valid N (listwise)

61

126.08

Maximum
396160.00
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Mean
60194.1428

Std. Deviation
76543.20802

TABLE 3: Correlation Matrix

Correlation Matrix
26 Day CAR
with company
vector
26 Day CAR

Pearson

with company

Correlation

Size
1

Extractive

CSR

NGO

Labor

Mulltidefs

-.071

-.151

.099

-.151

-.192

-.098

.503

.151

.348

.152

.067

.354

92

92

92

92

92

92

92

-.071

1

.285**

.130

-.120

-.445**

-.103

.006

.217

.255

.000

.330

vector
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Size

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Extractive

Pearson

.503
92

92

92

92

92

92

92

-.151

.285**

1

-.267*

-.144

-.272**

-.261*

.151

.006

.010

.170

.009

.012

92

92

92

92

92

92

92

.099

.130

-.267*

1

-.164

.054

.080

.348

.217

.010

.119

.608

.449

92

92

92

92

92

92

92

-.151

-.120

-.144

-.164

1

.257*

.235*

.152

.255

.170

.119

.013

.024

Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
CSR

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

NGO

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
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N
Labor

Pearson

92

92

92

92

92

92

92

-.192

-.445**

-.272**

.054

.257*

1

.224*

.067

.000

.009

.608

.013

92

92

92

92

92

92

92

-.098

-.103

-.261*

.080

.235*

.224*

1

.354

.330

.012

.449

.024

.032

92

92

92

92

92

92

Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Mulltidefs

Pearson

.032

Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Although all of the cases in our data set involve allegations of grave
human rights abuses or environmental misconduct, most of the cases cluster around one
of the following issues: 1) violations of international labor standards, including forced
labor, child labor, human trafficking, sweatshop labor, and systematic employment
discrimination; 2) environmental crimes, including pollution of groundwater and the
disruption of ecosystems; 3) harms committed by state security forces, including murder,
torture, rape, genocide, kidnapping, and unlawful detention; 4) harms committed by
paramilitary groups including intimidation, torture, and murder; and 5) support for the
Apartheid regime in South Africa. Figure 5 shows the distribution of cases in our data set
according to issue. 35

35

It should be noted that many lawsuits do not fit neatly into only one of our categories. An ATS
lawsuit filed in 2000 against British mining firm Rio Tinto for its activities on Bougainville
Island in Papua New Guinea is a case in point. The suit claims that the company requested and
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92

Figure 5: ATS Lawsuits by Issue

To account for the potential confounding of non-independence of measurement, a
company vector was generated, as suggested by Kerlinger and Pedhazur (1973), McNeil,
Newman, and Kelley (1996). This variable will allow one to determine the effect of the
independent variable of interest (lawsuit) that is independent of company differences due
to multiple lawsuits filed against individual companies. We did not include legal appeals
as events in our data set, as our focus is the market’s reaction to the onset of new
litigation.

obtained government support to suppress a local uprising against environmental damage caused
by the firm’s copper mining operations, as well as its racially discriminatory hiring practices
(Kaeb, 2008), and as such, this case is included in three of our categories: “Security forces,”
“Environment,” and “Labor practices.”
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While concern could be expressed about what may at first appear to be the small
sample size, it is notable that our total sample size is larger than those used by previous
studies of similar issues. For example, in their study of the relationship between boycotts
and boycott threats and target firm share price, Koku et al., (1997) used a sample size of
54. Event studies of boycotts by Pruitt and Friedman (1986) and Pruitt, Wei, and White
(1988), meanwhile, examined 21 and 16 events, respectively.

Statistical Analysis
We test our hypotheses using an event study methodology and ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression (Fraas & Newman, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Event
studies use the past performance of a firm’s stock to calculate the extent to which its
performance on and around an event deviates from expected performance, and then test
whether this deviation is statistically significant (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).
Developed by finance and accounting scholars (Brown & Warner, 1985), the event-study
methodology is based on the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that markets are
efficient in reflecting new information and therefore a firm’s stock price will quickly
adjust to the new information, reflecting all available information about the firm’s current
and future profit potential (Muth, 1961; Fama 1970). If any new information resulting
from the unexpected event is believed to affect a firm’s current or future earnings, the
security price changes as soon as the market learns of the event. Thus, stock prices are
viewed as reliable indicators of a firm’s value (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995).
In addition to the assumption of efficient markets, the event-study methodology
assumes that the events under study are unanticipated, and that no confounding events
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occur during the event window that could affect share price (McWilliams & Siegel,
1997). While the event-study methodology has its detractors, even critics such as
Schleifer (2000) acknowledge that the basic assumptions underpinning the methodology
are valid, that when executed properly it produces robust results, and that these studies
have significantly enhanced our understanding of stock market reaction to external
events.
In recent years management and IB researchers have used event studies to
examine the the stock market’s reaction to a variety of unanticipated events -- from
product recall announcements (Davidson & Worrell, 1992) and plant closings (Clinebell
& Clinebell, 1994) to congressional votes on international trade-related legislation (Oxley
& Schnietz, 2001). Event studies involve four basic steps: 1) Defining the event and
announcement period; 2) Measuring the stock’s return during the announcement period;
3) Estimating the expected return of the stock during the announcement period in the
absence of the announcement (i.e., normal returns); and 4) Computing the abnormal
return and testing its statistical significance (Bhagat & Romano, 2007). Most event
studies follow up this initial analysis by performing regression analysis to determine
whether certain variables of interest are related to the change in stock price (Godfrey et
al., 2009).
There are several different models used to derive normal returns, but the market
model is the one most commonly used in management research (MacKinlay, 1997). This
model is based on the argument that the expected return on an asset in the market is
linearly related to the contemporaneous return on the market portfolio, such that:
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Rit = αi + βiRmkt + eit

(equation 1)

In this equation, Rit captures the expected return for the ith firm’s share price on
that day controlling for market-based fluctuations. Rmkt is the return for the overall
market portfolio at time t, as defined by the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) equally-weighted stock market index; αi and βi are firm specific and timeindependent parameters; eit is the error term for stock i at time t. Following King & Soule
(2007) and Zajac & Westphal (2004), we regress stock market returns for the firms in our
sample against returns on a broad market portfolio for a period beginning 239 trading
days before the event and ending 21 days before the event. We then use the parameters
from equation 1 to forecast expected returns for a period of 20 days prior to the event (t20) to 5 days after the event (t+5).36 We include 5 days following the announcement to
ensure that any change in stock price is not temporary or the result of supply and demand
adjustments following the announcement (Doh et al., 2010). We then calculate abnormal
returns ARit, by subtracting the actual returns, obtained from CRSP, from the forecasted
returns, as shown in equation 2.

ARit = Rit – (αi + βiRmkt)

(equation 2)

36

It is important that there is no overlap between the estimation period and the event window so
as to prevent the “normal” returns (i.e., those that could have been expected had the event not
taken place) from being influenced by the event itself and thereby distorting the abnormal return
(MacKinlay, 1997). Our estimation period does not overlap with the event or the
preannouncement period, as it ends 21 trading days before the event, and a day before the
beginning of the preannouncement period.
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In the above equation, ARit is the abnormal return t of security i, Rit and Rmkt
are the returns on t of security i and the market portfolio, respectively. The parameters αi
and βi are estimated by an OLS regression. Each firm’s abnormal returns are then
standardized and cumulated over the event interval to derive the cumulative abnormal
return (CARi), providing a measure of how much the market value of a firm changed as a
result of the event. Cumulative abnormal returns of all firms in the sample are then
summed, and the sum is divided by the number of firms to derive the mean CAR, which
is then standardized and tested for significance (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).
Most event studies begin calculating the event window prior to the day of the
event because of the tendency for investors to receive news about the impending event
from private, non-news sources and social networks and act upon this news (Schleifer,
2000; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). This is particularly germane in the case of lawsuits since
plaintiffs often use the media as a vehicle to communicate with potential parties and leak
information to influence public opinion and gain leverage in legal proceedings (Koku,
2006). As such, we calculate CAR based on a 26-day window, which is consistent with
other research examining the shareholder wealth implications of stakeholder actions
including boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; Koku, Akhigbe, & Springer, 1997) and
protests (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002; King & Soule, 2007). However, to enhance the
probability that our findings were not merely a function of the length of the event
window, we calculated CAR for three additional windows: 21 days (day -15 to +5), 11
days (-5, +5), and two days (day -1 to 0). The smaller windows provide a more
conservative test (King & Soule, 2007), but may not capture the full market reaction to
the lawsuit announcement. Because we were interested in only investors’ initial reactions
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to the filing, we used a short window (+5 days) following the announcement to minimize
the possibility that confounding events, including the company’s actions in response to
the lawsuit, were captured in our event window (King & Soule, 2007).

Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable in this study is mean CAR, which is a standard measure
of abnormal stock price return in event studies (Brown & Warner, 1985; Zajac &
Westphal, 2004). CAR represents the idiosyncratic change in shareholder value, as
represented by stock price, surrounding the announcement of the lawsuit. Stated
differently, CAR is the sum of the daily differences between the firm’s actual and
expected return. If the market believes the lawsuit undermines the firm’s future financial
prospects, then CAR should be negative and significant; if investors determine that the
legal action poses no real financial threat to the firm, CAR should not be significantly
different from zero.
We derived CAR by gathering daily market returns from CRSP through the
Eventus software program available through the Wharton Research Data Service.
Following standard event study methodology, we selected the date of the first public
announcement of the litigation in the major business press as the event date (Day t=0). In
many cases, the first news item appeared on the day of the filing. In others it appeared on
the next trading day, or several days later. But in some cases information about an
impending lawsuit was published prior to the actual filing. In these cases, the date of the
pre-filing news item was used as the event date.
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Independent Variables
In addition to assessing the effect of ATS lawsuit announcements on target firm
stock price to test hypothesis 1, we examine whether certain characteristics of the
defendant, the plaintiff, and the legal case itself moderate the market’s reaction to these
lawsuits, to test hypotheses 2-6. We thus performed a regression with a set of predictor
variables, using the 26-day CAR as the dependent variable.
According to hypothesis 2, firms involved in mineral extraction and production
should experience larger negative returns upon announcement of an ATS lawsuit than
firms in other sectors because of the close ties these corporations often have to
authoritarian governments and militaries, their generally poor public image, and the
possibility that litigation may force these firms to settle or curtail otherwise profitable
activities. To assess this hypothesis, we create a dichotomous industry variable based on
whether the firm’s primary business activities involve mineral extraction or production
(via the provision of construction services) using the two-digit standard industrial
classification (SIC). The SIC classificatory scheme is commonly used in the management
and strategy literatures (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002; Epstein &
Schnietz, 2005). Firms involved in extraction or construction are coded with a 1, and
include those in the metal mining (10), coal mining (12), oil and gas extraction (13), nonmetallic minerals, except fuels (14), general building contractors (15), heavy
construction, except building (16), and special trade contractors (17) categories; firms not
involved in these activities are coded with a 0.
To test hypothesis 3, which predicts that firms with a reputation for social
responsibility will experience smaller negative returns upon the announcement of ATS
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lawsuits than firms without such reputations, we include a dichotomous variable based on
whether the firm was listed on the Calvert Social Index (CSI) in the year prior to that in
which the lawsuit was filed (CSI-listed firms are coded 1; non-listed firms 0). The CSI is
one of the most widely recognized indices of socially and environmentally responsible
corporations. Its membership includes companies that meet rigorous standards for
sustainable and socially responsible practices and are selected from the universe of
approximately the 1,000 largest U.S. companies, based on total market capitalization,
included in the Dow Jones Total Market Index. The Index is reconstituted once a year. As
of May 2011, 666 firms comprised the index. While not a reputation rating per se, the
CSI provides inputs for stakeholder groups in their formulation of a firm’s reputation for
social responsibility, and thus represent a good proxy for reputation – and one that has
been used by other management researchers (e.g., Doh et al., 2010).
To test hypothesis 4, that lawsuits filed by NGO plaintiffs or with NGO
representation will trigger a larger negative stock price reaction in target firms than those
filed by private law firms, we include a dichotomous variable based on whether the
plaintiff’s legal counsel includes an NGO. Those cases involving NGO participation are
coded 1; those filed by private firms without any NGO involvement are coded 0.
To test hypothesis 5, that lawsuits involving allegations of labor violations will
result in a larger negative stock market reaction than those involving other issues, we
include a dichotomous variable based on whether the principal legal claim centers on
violations of internationally recognized labor standards, such as the use of forced labor,
child labor, and anti-union activities. Cases involving labor claims are coded 1; all others
are coded 0.
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To test hypothesis 6, that lawsuits involving multiple corporate defendants will
result in a larger negative stock market reaction than those involving a single corporate
defendant, we include a dichotomous variable based on the number of defendant firms
named in the litigation. Those cases involving a single corporate defendant are coded 0;
those with multiple corporate defendants are coded 1.

Control Variables
Because large firms differ from small and medium-sized firms in fundamental
ways, including visibility (Rindova et al., 2006), access to resources (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978), political influence (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), and exposure to risk (Godfrey, 2005),
firm size is often used as a control variable in empirical studies in the strategy and IB
literatures (e.g., Hillman & Keim, 2001; Rehbein, 2004; Strike et al., 2006). Following
this literature, we control for firm size using the firm’s market capitalization (market
cap), which is a measurement of business value based on share price and number of
shares outstanding. A firm’s market cap represents the market's view of its stock value
and is a determining factor in stock valuation. Since market cap can vary significantly
from year to year, we generated a dichotomous variable based on whether the firm’s
average market cap was greater or less than $10 billion over a 5-year period beginning in
May 2006, and ending in May 2011. Firms with an average market cap of less than $10
billion are coded 0; those with an average market cap exceeding $10 billion are coded 1.
The final regression model is as follows:

ARit = α0 + β1 SZ + β2 EXT + β3 CSR + β4 NGO + β5 LAB + β6 ND +e
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Where ARit is the abnormal return for firm i over the 26-day event window (-20,
+5), SZ is the control variable for the size of the defendant firm, as measured by its
market capitalization, EXT is the dummy for whether the target company is in the
extractive industry, CSR is the dummy for whether the target company has a reputation
for social responsibility, NGO is the dummy variable for whether the plaintiff in the
lawsuit is represented by an NGO, LAB is the dummy variable for whether the lawsuit
involves allegations of international labor violations, and ND is the dummy variable for
whether the lawsuit names more than one corporate defendant.

XI. Results
To test hypothesis 1, that the announcement of ATS lawsuits lead to a negative
stock market reaction, we assessed the statistical significance of the CAR for four event
windows: 2-days (-1, 0), 11-days (-5, +5), 21-days (-15, +5), and 26-days (-20, +5). Table
4 shows the test statistics for CAR for these windows, using the Market Model, Equally
Weighted Index.37

37

Since our sample includes many large-cap firms, we also ran our analysis using a ValueWeighted Index (Market Model). These results were not substantially different, although the
CAR in the 11-day window was no longer significant, and the size of the negative CAR in the 21
and 26 day windows was smaller (-1.13%) and (-0.52%), respectively.
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TABLE 4: Test Statistics for Cumulative Abnormal Returns

1
Event
Window
26-day
21-day
11-day
2-day

2
Days

3
N

(-20, +5)
(-15, +5)
(-5, +5)
(-1, 0)

92
92
92
92

4
Mean
CAR
-4.76%
-4.39%
-1.52%
-0.61%

5
CAAR

6
Patell Z

7
p-value

-4.88%
-4.50%
-1.59%
-0.35%

-4.669
-4.792
-2.344
-1.203

<.0001**
<.0001**
<.001**
<.1144

Columns 1 and 2 show the different event windows and the specific days before
and after the event included in these windows, respectively. The third column shows the
number of cases. Column four provides the mean CAR, which is expressed as a
percentage and represents the average cumulative percentage change in a stock price
below that which was expected. Column 5 shows the cumulative average abnormal return
(CAAR), which is an alternative way of signifying the average change and can be
interpreted as the cumulative percentage change in the daily means of the firms’
abnormal returns (King & Soule, 2007). Column 6 contains Patell’s Z, a standard
measure of statistical significance in event studies, and column 7 shows the p-value.
Our results show that in the 2-day window, the stock market’s reaction is
negative, as expected, but not significant. The mean CAR is -0.61%, with a Patell’s Z
value of -1.203. These results are consistent with those reported by Koku (2006), who
examined class-action lawsuits filed by private parties against corporations and did not
find a significant market reaction on the announcement date, and Koku et al. (2001), who
analyzed lawsuits filed against corporate defendants by individuals and failed to find
significance during a 2-day window surrounding the announcement.
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Koku (2006) did, however, report significance when using a wider event window,
as do we. Consistent with our expectations, the mean CAR is negative in all three of our
longer windows and statistically significant. Stock prices of targeted firms declined on
average by 4.76% during the 26-day window (-20, +5), representing a loss in shareholder
wealth of roughly $2.86 billion for the average firm in our sample. Likewise, the share
price of targeted firms declined on average by 4.39% during the 21-day window (-15,
+5), and by 1.52% during the 11-day window (-5, +5), representing losses in shareholder
wealth of roughly $2.6 billion and $912 million, respectively, for the average firm in our
sample.
To appreciate the magnitude of this effect, it is instructive to compare our results
to those found by researchers analyzing other stakeholder actions. For instance, in their
study of the relationship of protests to stock price returns, King and Soule (2007) found
that targeted firms suffered a -1.03% return during the 26-day window. This suggests that
the market views civil litigation in general, and ATS lawsuits in particular, as a much
more serious economic threat to firms than protests – a fact that may help explain why
firms targeted by lawsuits are more likely to offer concessions than those targeted with
other stakeholder tactics (e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 2006).
Regression Analysis of CAR
To determine whether a relationship exists between our independent variables and
abnormal returns and the magnitude of any such relationship, we performed an OLS
regression using the 26-day CAR as our dependent variable, following the method used
by King and Soule (2007). Regression results are shown in Table 5.
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TABLE 5: Regression Coefficients

Regression Coefficientsa
Model

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
B

1

2

Std. Error

(Constant)

-4.027

1.874

Size

-1.559

2.320

3.098

3.168

Size

-3.763

2.625

*Extractive

-4.450

*NGO

Coefficients
t

Beta

Sig.

-2.149

.034

-.672

.503

.978

.331

-.171

-1.434

.155

2.646

-.195

-1.682

.096**

-2.167

2.534

-.094

-.855

.395

*CSR

2.013

2.945

.076

.684

.496

*Labor

-6.257

2.657

-.281

-2.355

.021**

*Mulltidefs

-1.854

2.314

-.087

-.801

.425

(Constant)

-.071

a.

Dependent Variable: 26 Day CAR with company vector

b.

* = sign in predicted direction

c.

** = statistically significant at p<.05 based upon the appropriate directional test of significance

As we can see, the coefficient for “Labor” is negative and significant (p<.05),
suggesting that ATS lawsuits involving allegations of labor rights abuses are viewed by
investors as particularly serious threats to the corporate defendant’s economic prospects.
This finding is consistent with past empirical research showing that protests targeting
labor issues generated lower than expected stock price returns than those targeting other
issues (King & Soule, 2007). The coefficient for “Extractive” is also negative and
significant (p<.05), suggesting that investors also view ATS litigation involving large
mining and construction firms as a considerable economic threat. This finding is
consistent with past research showing that firms in industries with reputations for
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environmentally-damaging operations, including mining, energy, and chemicals,
experienced proportionately greater market declines in the aftermath of the 1999 WTO
protests in Seattle than firms with reputations for responsible environmental practices
(Epstein & Schnietz, 2002). None of the other predictor variables are significant,
although all of the signs are in the expected direction.

XII. Discussion
Our findings suggest that the announcement of civil lawsuits against MNEs for
alleged complicity in human rights abuses and other misconduct overseas has a
substantial negative relationship to the target firm’s share price. Moreover, we find cases
alleging violations of internationally recognized labor standards are associated with a
significant loss of shareholder wealth, as are cases targeting extractive companies. These
findings have important implications for multinational firms with existing operations in
developing countries, as well as those considering such investments. For firms with
existing investments, it suggests that they can no longer turn a blind eye to serious human
rights abuses committed by government security forces, paramilitary groups, or private
security forces, since they may be held liable for abetting these abuses in a U.S. federal
court and have to pay a steep financial price.
But it is not only the conduct of foreign governments and security forces that need
to be more closely monitored; MNEs increasingly must answer for the activities of joint
venture and consortium partners as well as other businesses in their supply chains and
certify that the final products sold under their brand names were produced in a humane
and ethical way. This is a considerable challenge given the growing complexity of supply

89

chains in many industries, which may include overseas suppliers, agents, contractors, and
other third parties. As Dovey (2009) observes, a key question for corporate managers is
to determine how far down the supply chain their responsibility goes, and then take steps
to enhance due diligence. In some cases this may involve terminating relationships with
contractors, as Levi Strauss did in Saipan after discovering that the contractor imposed
forced labor on some of its Chinese workers and failed to honor minimum wage
legislation (Schoen et al., 2005). In others it may involve coming up with creative
solutions to preserve valuable sourcing relationships, as Levi’s did in Bangladesh after it
found out that its local contractor employed workers under the age of 14 in its factories,
in violation of company guidelines, but permissible under local law. In this case the
company chose to pay the workers while they attended school and then give them fulltime jobs upon turning 14 (Schoen et al., 2005).
Similarly, our research suggests that the “enclave model” of political risk
management (Kapstein, 2006) favored over the years by extractive companies and other
firms doing business in conflict zones may no longer be viable. After all, this model,
which is premised on minimizing contact with local communities and other stakeholder
groups through heavy investments in perimeter security and close operational
relationships with local militaries, may invite unwanted attention from activist and antigovernment groups. These groups may specifically target the MNE to make a political
statement or provoke it into a disproportionate response, which can then serve as the
basis for a lawsuit.
A much better approach, in many cases, may be the “engagement model”
(Kapstein, 2006), which involves looking for ways to embed the firm within the host
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society, typically by forging close relationships with community groups and investing in
schools, clinics, roads, water wells, and other infrastructure. Such an approach may
enhance the firm’s legitimacy and help it maintain its “social license” to operate
(Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004). Firms adopting an engagement strategy –
especially in the context of violent conflict -- may also gain a sustainable, long term-term
competitive advantage (Oetzel, Getz, & Ladek, 2007). As former Talisman Energy CEO
Jim Buckee recently remarked: “If you are seen as a welcome presence on the ground,
then you are in a much better position than if you are hated” (Campbell, 2011).
Our research also suggests that firms with existing operations in high-risk
developing countries ought to look for ways to reduce their vulnerability to ATS lawsuits.
Possibilities run the gamut from adopting human rights policies, voluntary codes of
conduct, joining multilateral stakeholder engagement initiatives such as the UN Global
Compact (Janney, Dess, & Forlani, 2009), and entering into multi-stakeholder
partnerships with NGOs, academics, and other civil society groups (Dahan et al., 2010).
A particularly innovative partnership initiative was launched in 2007 following an ATS
lawsuit against Yahoo! Inc. for providing private user information to the Chinese
government, which then used it to arrest a political dissident. Formed by technology
industry leaders including Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft, and NGOs, academics, and
investors, the Global Network Initiative provides guidance to firms on how to protect
freedom of expression and the right to privacy in the face of demands from authoritarian
governments (Dovey, 2009).
Other noteworthy multi-stakeholder partnership programs include the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, which brings together governments, firms, NGOs, and
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other stakeholder groups to address the issue of transparency in company payments to
foreign governments for natural resource projects, and the Voluntary Principles on
Human Rights and Security, a set of principles developed by extractive firms,
governments, and NGOs to provide guidance on how to balance the need for the security
and safety of employees and contractors with human rights obligations (Dovey, 2009). As
management research on multi-stakeholder partnerships suggests, participation in these
alliances can help enhance firm legitimacy and reduce risks while serving as a source of
creativity and innovation that lead to new business opportunities (Hart & Sharma, 2004;
Yaziji, 2004).
For firms that are contemplating major investments in developing countries,
particularly those with weak institutions, social and ethnic cleavages, or a history of
human rights abuses, our research suggests that they should think twice. Some potentially
profitable opportunities may be so fraught with social, legal, and reputational risk that
they do not merit the investment. If a decision is made to proceed, firms should begin by
conducting detailed risk assessments that go beyond the conventional analyses of
political threats, including the possibility of nationalization by host governments or of
kidnapping, extortion, and intimidation of personnel by criminal elements. They must
also examine the potential social and environmental impact their operations may have on
a broader range of stakeholders, the potential grievances these projects might engender,
and the possibility that these grievance might resonate with activists and investors both
domestically and abroad. As Drimmer (2010) observes, in conducting these risk
assessments, investors should seek input for a wide variety of parties, including
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community leaders, government officials, and NGOs, and then craft a compliance
program that addresses these concerns.
Knowing that their firms’ share prices are vulnerable to ATS lawsuits and the
cloud of impropriety that accompany them, managers have an incentive to try to resolve
these disputes proactively, before they result in litigation. Thus, from a corporate strategy
standpoint, it would seem to make sense for firms facing the prospect of ATS litigation to
reach out and initiate a dialogue with external stakeholder groups that could result in an
out-of-court resolution. Such advice runs counter to that offered by Koku et al. (2001),
who argued that firms should litigate lawsuits brought by individuals (including ATS
cases, presumably), while settling those brought by other corporations, owing to the
greater likelihood of losing in court to another corporation. While we acknowledge that
defendant firms are likely to prevail in ATS cases that make it to trial (based on the small
number of cases that have made it that far in the legal process), the victory might be a
Pyrrhic one, given the hefty legal costs and damaging media attention that accompany
such lawsuits. To this list of negative consequences we can now add the likelihood of a
substantial loss of shareholder wealth in the days leading up to, and following, the filing
of the lawsuit.
The idea that firms should settle such cases regardless of their merit raises the
issue of moral hazard. If NGOs and other stakeholder groups conclude that they can
easily win large settlements from corporations by initiating legal action, firms may
quickly become inundated with a wave of new cases. However, this possibility is
tempered by the reality that NGOs typically have limited resources and that mounting an
ATS case is a costly endeavor that requires significant time and legal expertise.
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Moreover, recent court decisions have raised the bar in terms of what type of evidence is
required from plaintiffs before a case is allowed to proceed beyond the pleading stage
(Dunst, 2009). Thus, we do not foresee an exponential rise in ATS litigation in the
coming years – although a steady increase is possible.

Limitations
This research enhances our understanding of the relationship between anticorporate civil litigation and target firm stock price reaction, thereby filling a gap in the
empirical literature on stakeholder challenges to multinational firms. However, our study
has several limitations. First, the constraints of our data and time period limit the scope of
validity beyond the specific circumstance that is the subject of our analysis. Moreover,
the construct validity of some of our measures could be questioned. For instance, while
we believe that inclusion in the Calvert Social Index is a reasonable proxy for
“Reputation for CSR,” firms interact with society in a variety of different and complex
ways, and it is possible that particular companies included in the list are viewed
unfavorably by certain stakeholder groups, while other firms generally viewed as
exemplary corporate citizens were omitted.

Future Research
Future scholars should analyze the extent to which the declines in shareholder
wealth experienced by firms targeted by ATS lawsuits is a temporary phenomena, or
more long lasting in nature, and whether subsequent lawsuits against a company have a
similar effect on shareholder wealth. Research by Koku et al. (2001) suggests that firms
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that are subject to repeated lawsuits may become “judgment proof,” in the sense that
investors do not react in the same way to the announcement of new litigation as they did
in the past, having already factored the probability of future lawsuits into the current
share price.
The filing of the initial lawsuit is by no means the only significant event in the
litigation life cycle. The market might view subsequent events including judgments on
motions to dismiss, the filing of appeals, reversals by higher courts of lower court
decisions, settlements, trials, and verdicts as equally or more significant. Thus, discerning
whether there is a systematic pattern in the market reaction to news of such events is
another important task for future research. Additionally, scholars should examine whether
and how human-rights related litigation filed in U.S. state courts under statutes such as
the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Practices Act (RICO), as well as in foreign courts, is related to shareholder wealth, given
the trend of plaintiffs filing transnational tort cases similar in substance to ATS cases
outside the federal court system.38
Finally, future researchers might also examine the extent to which a corporation’s
stock price is related to the amount of media attention the lawsuit garners, the jurisdiction
in which it is filed, and whether the lawsuit is part of a larger stakeholder campaign
involving boycotts, protests, or shareholder resolutions. These questions provide a rich

38

Examples of human rights-related cases filed in state rather than federal courts include those
brought by banana workers on plantations in Nicaragua and elsewhere against Dole Foods, Dow
Chemical, Shell Oil, and Occidental Petroleum for exposure to the pesticide DBCP. Occidental
Petroleum has also been sued in a California state court by Peruvian plaintiffs for allegedly
contaminating land and rivers in the Amazon region (Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum). An
example of a human rights case filed in a foreign court is the one against Trafigura, a
multinational oil-trading company, for allegedly dumping toxic oil off the coast of the Ivory
Coast (Drimmer, 2010).
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research agenda for future scholarly inquiry into the relationship between stakeholderinitiated civil litigation and corporate financial performance.
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Essay III: Is It Who They Are or What They Do? Understanding the Factors that Predict
Extractive Firm Vulnerability to Secondary Stakeholder-Initiated Human Rights
Litigation

XIII. Abstract and Introduction
Organizational researchers have recently examined the efforts of activist groups to
influence corporate policies and practices through coercive tactics. Yet the issue of why
certain firms are targeted for anti-corporate campaigns while others escape scrutiny has
not yet been fully explored. Drawing upon social movement and social identity theories,
we developed and tested a set of hypotheses on how stakeholder groups select their
targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, a law
that gives U.S. federal courts extraterritorial jurisdiction for cases involving allegations of
serious offenses committed against foreign citizens. We found support for the idea that
multinational targets are selected based on both interest and identity factors. Conclusions
and implications for practice are drawn.

Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the phenomena of
private politics (Baron, 2003), whereby activist groups seek to change corporate practices
by directly targeting firms with coercive tactics, rather than exerting influence indirectly
via appeals to the government (King & Soule, 2007; Reid & Toffel, 2009).39 While anticorporate activism has a long history in the United States, dating back at least to the
Boston Tea Party (King, 2009), it appears to have taken on new vigor in recent decades,

39

Appeals to the government typically include lobbying legislators and regulators and seeking
judicial interpretations that institutionalize new and more favorable norms (Reid & Toffel, 2009).
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spurred by the growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Yaziji & Doh, 2009;
Doh & Teegen, 2003). Defined as social, cultural, legal, and environmental advocacy
and/or operational groups that have goals that are primarily non-commercial (Kourula &
Laasonen, 2009), NGOs have established themselves as important agents of political and
social change, championing issues ranging from animal welfare to climate change (Lyon,
2010). NGOs have raised awareness of ethical issues in global supply chains,
spearheaded monitoring efforts of overseas factories, and promoted private certification
schemes that encourage firms to adopt sustainable business practices (Conroy, 2007;
O’Rourke, 2005). With more than 30,000 NGOs operating internationally, one-tenth of
these drawing membership from three or more countries (Vogel, 2008), NGOs have
considerable global reach. NGOs have grown in stature and influence in recent years and
are now seen by some as having supplanted the role of host governments in the historic
business-government bargaining relationship (Yaziji & Doh, 2009).
Related to the growth of NGOs has been the spread of social movements, which
have been defined as “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and
continuity outside of institutional channels for the purpose of seeking or resisting change
in some extant system of authority (Soule, 2009).” Together, NGOs and social
movements, which often share similar characteristics and overlapping membership
(Davis & Zald, 2005), have helped to fill a “governance gap” caused by the decline in
power of national governments and organized labor, coupled with the growing clout of
“footloose” multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Soule, 2009; King & Pearce, 2010).
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Using a variety of coercive tactics, from boycotts to shareholder (proxy)
resolutions,40 NGOs and social movements pressure companies to meet their demands.
Some of these tactics, such as civil lawsuits, impose a direct financial obligation on the
target firm in the form of legal and public relations expenses (Lenox & Eesley, 2009).
Others, like boycotts and protests, may affect consumption patterns and corporate share
price – particularly if they generate extensive media coverage (King & Soule, 2007;
King, 2008; Martin & Kracher, 2008). All may inflict serious reputational harm, making
it more difficult for the firm to attract and retain employees, suppliers, and investors,
while diverting managerial attention away from more pressing strategic and operational
concerns (Vogel, 2005; Yaziji & Doh, 2009).41
Management and organization researchers seeking to understand the interplay
between activist groups and corporations have recently employed stakeholder theory
(Freeman, 1984) as a theoretical lens (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Stakeholder
theory accords NGOs and social movements the status of “secondary stakeholders,”
which, unlike primary stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, suppliers, and
creditors), are not vital to organizational survival (Clarkson, 1995). As such, these groups
should attract little managerial attention (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Yet we know that mangers not only pay attention to these secondary stakeholders,
they sometimes meet their demands. For instance, PepsiCo, Disney, Levi Strauss, and
Apple Computer, among others, bowed to pressure from the student-based Free Burma
40

Proxy resolutions are often initiated by activists who specifically buy enough shares to initiate a
vote on these resolutions at annual shareholder meetings (Soule, 2009).

41

In addition to using coercive tactics to inflict harm upon firms, NGOs and social movements
seek to create new markets for sustainable products and services, including “sweat-free” garments
and fair trade coffee (O’Rourke, 2005).
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Coalition in the 1990s and divested from Burma (Myanmar) (Spar & LaMure, 2003);
Nike capitulated to the United Students Against Sweatshops and affiliated pressure
groups and demanded that foreign suppliers improve working conditions within their
factories (Soule, 2009); Starkist conceded to the Earth Island Institute’s (EII) demands
that it implement dolphin-safe fishing practices throughout its foreign supply chain
(Frooman, 1999); and grocery chain Trader Joe’s agreed under pressure from Greenpeace
to remove genetically modified products from its shelves (Frooman & Murrell, 2005).
Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, a coalition of environmental groups that included
Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network succeeded in getting the forest products
industry to establish the Forest Stewardship Council, a private regulatory body that put
forth stringent industry-wide deforestation standards (Bartley, 2007).
While there is growing recognition amongst organization researchers that
secondary stakeholder groups can and do exert meaningful influence vis-à-vis firms and
markets (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; King & Pearce, 2010), the question of why
particular firms become targets of activist pressure while others fly below the radar has
only received limited attention in the management literature (Whetten, Rands, &
Godfrey, 2002).
Rowley and Moldoveneau (2003) propose that anti-corporate activist groups are
driven by two distinct sets of factors: interest-based motivations and identity-based
motivations. The former pertain to issues these groups hold to be important, including
conservation, social justice, and non-discrimination in the workplace. Identity-based
factors, by contrast, relate to the organizational imperative to foster solidarity and
collective identity. If stakeholder groups are driven primarily by interest-based
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motivations, they might be expected to target companies in industries that generate
negative externalities such as air and water pollution, as well as specific firms perceived
to be particularly negligent on social, environmental, and workplace issues. Conversely,
if driven primarily by identity-based motivations, these groups might be expected to
target companies for reasons unrelated to their industry or social performance. Indeed,
such groups might choose to target highly visible and socially progressive firms to
generate publicity and mobilize support from members and donors (Rowley &
Moldoveneau, 2003).
A recent review of the empirical literature suggests that “both repeated wrongdoers and larger and more visible firms are at a greater risk of stakeholder scrutiny,” thus
lending support for both interest-based and identity-based explanations (de Bakker & den
Hond, 2008). Whether this holds true for stakeholder-initiated civil lawsuits, however,
remains an unanswered question. Legal challenges differ from other stakeholder tactics in
important ways. They are typically more expensive to mount than proxy resolutions,
boycotts, or protests, more difficult to organize and execute, and require specialized legal
knowledge that few NGOs possess (Holzmeyer, 2009).

Moreover,

litigation-based

campaigns require broader and denser support networks than do other types of
stakeholder campaigns, particularly those involving allegations of overseas crimes, since
attorneys must often rely on intermediaries to gain access to local communities to gather
evidence (Davis, 2008; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). Finally, since successful legal
campaigns require significant resource commitments over extended periods of time,
plaintiffs hoping to prevail must consider the resources their prospective target might be
able to marshal to defeat the challenge – a strategic calculation that stakeholder groups
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employing alternative tactics like boycotts or protests may not need to make (Holzmeyer,
2009).
Thus, from the standpoint of the NGOs considering potential corporate targets for
their legal campaigns, do interest or identity factors take precedence? Or, stated
differently, are targeting decisions based on who they are or what they do? We study this
question by examining lawsuits filed by NGOs in recent years against natural resources
firms under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a controversial 1789 law that allows foreign
citizens to sue private individuals and corporations in U.S. federal courts for specific
international human rights violations.42 Since a landmark 1996 case against Unocal for
alleged complicity in human rights violations committed by the Burmese military in
furtherance of a $1.2 billion natural gas pipeline project,43 the ATS has been used to sue
some of the world’s largest MNEs, including Citigroup, Dow Chemical, General Motors,
Exxon Mobil, Chiquita, Bridgestone, Coca-Cola, IBM, and Wal-Mart (Gallagher, 2010).
These charges range from aiding repressive governments in their efforts to crack down on
political dissidents (Yahoo, Cisco Systems) to conducting non-consensual clinical trials
on children (Pfizer) (Drimmer, 2010).
Although firms from a wide variety of industries, including chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, financial services, and agriculture, and food and beverages, have been

42

The ATS, which is part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, allows individual plaintiffs to sue for
violations of the “law of nations.” While legal scholars dispute which specific crimes constitute
violations of this law, there is general agreement that the list includes extrajudicial killing, rape,
genocide, slavery, and torture (Drimmer, 2010).
43

The Unocal case was filed in 1996 by NGOs Earth Rights International and the Center for
Constitutional Rights on behalf of Burmese villagers who claim they were beaten, raped, tortured,
and conscripted into labor by the Burmese military as part of the Yadana natural gas pipeline
project jointly owned by Unocal, Total of France, and the Burmese government (Davis, 2008).
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sued under ATS, those involved in natural resource extraction have been the most
frequent targets (Drimmer, 2010). This may be because extractive firms typically have
limited choices about where they can invest -- they must go where the resources are.
Since these resources are often buried beneath the soil in countries run by authoritarian
regimes or torn by internal conflict, MNEs involved in natural resource extraction may be
particularly vulnerable to claims of complicity in human rights abuses (Kaeb, 2008).
But even amongst extractive firms, not all players appear equally exposed to ATS
litigation. Of the U.S.’s three largest privately-owned oil and gas companies
(supermajors), two – Exxon Mobil and Chevron – have been targeted with ATS lawsuits,
and both have been sued multiple times. Yet the other supermajor, ConocoPhillips, which
also operates in countries prone to instability and violence, has escaped ATS litigation.
What explains this anomaly? Likewise, what explains the fact that Occidental Petroleum,
a company with assets of $52 billion, has been sued four times under ATS, while
Marathon Oil, a company of equivalent size (in assets) and with operations in some of the
same countries has been given a pass?
Given that legal analysts expect a steady drumbeat of ATS cases against MNEs
and their senior executives for years to come (Drimmer, 2010), it is important for
managers to understand the factors that may make their firms vulnerable to this type of
activist pressure. Such knowledge may allow them to craft effective risk mitigation
strategies that safeguard corporate reputations and preserve shareholder wealth.
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XIV. Theory and Literature Review
In recent years a growing, multidisciplinary body of scholarly research has
emerged that examines the ways in which activist groups interact with firms and markets
(Kourula & Laasonen, 2009; Doh & Teegen, 2003; Rao, 2009). Much of this literature
uses stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) as a conceptual lens. A stakeholder is “any
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s
objectives (Freeman, 1984: 46).” In contrast to the shareholder perspective, which views
profit maximization as the sole objective of the corporation (Friedman, 1962),
stakeholder theory views the economic goals of the corporation to be less important than
organizational survival, which can be enhanced by cultivating strong relationships with a
wide array of groups with a stake in the corporation, including employees, customers,
suppliers, creditors, and communities, as well as shareholders (Soule, 2009).
Stakeholder theory accords NGOs and social movements the status of secondary
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). Unlike the primary stakeholders of the company (e.g.,
shareholders, workers, suppliers, and creditors), secondary stakeholders have no
contractual bond to the firms they seek to influence, little resource leverage, and are not
necessary for survival (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). As such, theory suggests
they should attract little attention from managers and have limited sway over corporate
policy (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008). Mitchell and colleagues (1997) claim that
managers are most likely to pay attention to the demands of those stakeholders with
power, legitimacy, and urgency.44 Empirical research supports the notion that managers

44

According to Mitchell and colleagues (1997), a stakeholder has power to the extent that it “has
or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means to impose its will in the
relationship.” Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values,
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tend to resist influence efforts by secondary stakeholders, while being more receptive to
overtures from primary stakeholders (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; David et al.,
2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006).
But, as previously mentioned, it is clear that secondary stakeholder groups do
sometimes influence corporate policies and practices – in ways both subtle and profound.
How, then, do secondary stakeholder groups select the corporate targets they wish to
influence? As de Bakker and den Hond (2008) observe, few management researchers
have analyzed this question. Nor have social movement scholars, who have traditionally
focused their attention on influence efforts aimed at states, given this question due
attention (Soule, 2009). As Bartley and Child (2007) point out, the constitution of
corporate targets for social movement pressure is a topic “ripe for sociological analysis.”
Perhaps the most compelling explanation of stakeholder mobilization and
targeting has been put forth by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003). Building upon social
movement and social identity theories (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Fireman & Gamson,
1979), the authors argue that both interests and identities influence activist groups in their
decisions to take action against firms. The case for interest-based motivations is anchored
in rational choice theory (Olson, 1965). It suggests that activist groups act to advance or
protect their particular interests – especially when they perceive these interests to be
under threat (Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & Blair, 1991). Thus, an environmental NGO
(ENGO) might be expected to target a firm that is a notorious polluter, whereas a labor
rights advocacy NGO might confront a firm renowned for using sweatshop labor.

beliefs, and definitions.” And urgency “exists only when two conditions are met: 1) when a
relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive nature and 2) when that relationship or claim is
important or critical to the stakeholder.”
105

Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) accept this logic, but contend that stakeholder
groups also take actions to strengthen their internal solidarity and collective identity,
irrespective of whether these actions advance their organization’s strategic goals. Thus, a
stakeholder group might undertake an action with little realistic chance of success (e.g., a
boycott) against a firm that is widely admired (e.g., Starbucks), simply because the action
affirms the group’s social identity. A stakeholder group might also initiate action against
a target firm primarily to differentiate itself from other stakeholder groups that share
similar goals, thereby satisfying its desire to establish a unique identity (Rowley &
Moldoveanu, 2003). In short, from an identity-based perspective, collective action is an
end in itself, rather than a means to achieve more rational interests (Larana, Johnston, &
Gusfield, 1994).
Several researchers have attempted to subject these ideas to an empirical test.
Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves (2004), for instance, used the Rowley & Moldoveanu’s
(2003) theory as the framework for their study of the targeting decisions of religious,
environmental, and pro-labor activist groups filing proxy resolutions at shareholder
meetings. They found that these shareholder activists tend to target companies with
problematic products and poor environmental and community-related practices, thus
providing support for interest-based explanations. But they also found that activists target
large and highly visible firms, providing support for identity-based explanations.
Similarly, Bartley and Child (2007) found that identity-based characteristics such
as firm image, reputation, and size influence the targeting decisions of anti-sweatshop
activists, as do interest-based factors, including the extent to which a firm has globalized
its production through contractual agreements with foreign garment producers. Lenox
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and Eesley (2009) reached similar conclusions in their study of ENGO campaigns against
corporate targets. They found the likelihood of being targeted with lawsuits, protests,
boycotts, letter-writing campaigns, and proxy votes to be related to both “issue factors”
(i.e., environmental performance) and “identity factors” (i.e., size and visibility).
Taking a different methodological approach, Hendry (2006), who conducted
interviews with leaders of ENGOs such as Greenpeace and Environmental Defense,
found that activists weighed factors such as the firm’s environmental impact, as well as
its size and potential influence on others in its organizational field, when making
targeting decisions. In short, the available evidence, empirical and anecdotal, suggests
that both interest and identity factors influence the targeting decisions of NGOs.
Although it has yet to be examined, there is reason to believe that both interest
and identity-based motivations are also salient to NGOs that file ATS litigation. After all,
the small cadre of NGOs that initiate these lawsuits (by serving as legal counsel to
foreign plaintiffs) are publicly committed to pursuing social justice and advancing
international human rights norms. Targeting firms that condone or facilitate crimes like
murder, torture, and forced labor, would thus appear to serve their organizational
interests.
Moreover, by “naming and shaming” firms that allegedly violate human and
workers’ rights and despoil the environment, these NGOs may feel they are sending a
signal to other firms within the target firm’s industry, as well as the broader
organizational field, that they should think carefully about their social and environmental
footprint (Fielding, 2008).45
45

A litigator with the NGO Earth Rights International recently suggested as much: “I think that
(the) Unocal (case) and these other cases have caught enough attention that any corporate counsel
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Similarly, NGOs that initiate ATS litigation might calculate that their actions
could cause government regulators to increase their scrutiny of the target firm, thereby
prompting directors concerned about the firm’s reputation to pressure managers to
improve their social and environmental practices (Williams & Conley, 2007). Finally,
NGOs that initiate ATS cases might believe that even if their efforts do not bear
immediate fruit, they are tilling the soil for future social change, thereby serving as
“transnational norm entrepreneurs” (Koh, 1998).
Also consistent with interest-based explanations is the idea that NGOs might be
motivated to file ATS lawsuits to solidify relationships with like-minded stakeholder
groups and gain access to new resource streams (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). After
all, preparing an ATS case is an expensive and time-consuming process that requires
extensive research and evidence-gathering, both at home and abroad (Davis, 2008). By
leveraging relationships with other advocacy groups, as well as public interest attorneys,
and corporate attorneys offering pro-bono services, NGOs may be able to increase the
number of cases they take on, while enhancing their odds of success in court (Davis,
2008; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999).
And while it is not clear that “relationship building” has been the explicit
objective of any past ATS filings, it certainly has been an important outcome. The
landmark Doe vs. Unocal litigation is a case in point. Filed by the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) and Earth Rights International (ERI), the case helped
galvanize the international human rights community and establish a tight network of
NGOs and public interest attorneys with expertise in human rights litigation (Davis,
worth his salary… is going to say wait a second you need to think about this. If this happens
you’re going to get sued” (Davis, 2008).
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2008). The Unocal case also enabled NGOs to tap new sources of finance: ERI was
founded with seed money from the Echoing Green foundation based on the promise of
the case (Holzmeyer, 2009). Meanwhile, the funds the plaintiffs received from the
settlement – estimated at between $30 and $60 million (Kropf, 2010) -- provided
substantial resources to pursue future litigation.
But interest-based explanations for NGO-initiated legal action do not appear to
tell the whole story. After all, as previously mentioned, the costs of preparing these
lawsuits in terms of time, energy, and resources are substantial, while odds of prevailing
in court are exceedingly small. Indeed, of the more than 100 corporate ATS cases that
have been filed to date, most have been dismissed by federal courts on jurisdictional
grounds,46 a few have been settled,47 and the two that have made it to trial have resulted
in verdicts for the defendants (Drimmer, 2010).48 The prospects for success in ATS
litigation, in the form of a trial victory or settlement, are in fact so dim that the act of
filing such lawsuits -- like that of filing proxy resolutions -- may be akin to pursuing a

46

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the courts may dismiss cases if a more appropriate
alternative forum exists.

47

The list of corporate ATS cases that have been settled in recent years includes the so-called
“Nazi gold” lawsuits of the late 1990s, which secured $1.25 billion in compensation from Swiss
banks for victims of the Holocaust and the case against Unocal in Burma (reportedly between $30
and $60 million). Other major settlements include those involving U.S. apparel and retail
companies for allegations related to sweatshop labor in Saipan ($20 million), Royal Dutch Shell
for alleged human rights violations in the Niger Delta ($15.5 million), and Yahoo! Inc. for
divulging private information on political dissidents to the Chinese government (undisclosed
amount) (Goldhaber, 2010).

48

One of these cases (Bowoto v. Chevron) alleged that Chevron was complicit in the Nigerian
military’s violent crackdown against unarmed protesters at one of the company’s offshore oil
platforms. The other case (Romero v. Drummond Co.) was based on accusations that the
Drummond Company conspired with Colombian paramilitary organizations to murder union
leaders at one of its coal mines (Kropf, 2010).
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“lost cause” (Rao, 2001).49 Given the high costs associated with filing ATS cases and
their low success rates, NGOs interested in changing corporate practices in the
developing world would seem to be better served by engaging in other types of
advocacy.50
If interest-based motivations do not fully explain why NGOs choose to target
firms with ATS litigation, it may be because other motivations are at play, namely the
desire to affirm and solidify the group’s identity (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). There
are numerous ways in which the act of filing civil litigation against a corporation could
satisfy an NGO’s identity needs, even if the litigation is ultimately unsuccessful. For
instance, it might mobilize support from members and grass-roots activists that like the
idea of confronting powerful corporate interests in a public forum (McCann, 1994).
Targeting large, prominent, profitable, and well-reputed corporations with allegations of
grave misconduct might also be expected to draw publicity, thereby energizing supporters
and renewing their emotional investment in the NGO (Melucci, 1995).
Filing ATS cases against corporations might also enable NGOs to distinguish
themselves from other organizations pursuing similar agendas, thereby enhancing their
appeal to donors. After all, there is a plethora of advocacy groups committed to
progressive causes, and the competition for donations is intense (Weisbrod, 1998). Just as
firms find it important to distinguish themselves from their rivals when appealing to
49

Rao (2001) contends that individuals, acting as “gadflies,” submit proxy resolutions and attend
shareholder meetings to protest firm practices, despite the fact that few other shareholders share
their concerns, and with the knowledge that their activities will most likely have little or no
impact on firm behavior.

50

As Holzmeyer (2009) observes, two prominent schools of legal thought, Legal Realism and
Critical Legal Studies (CLS), regard litigation as having little potential to promote meaningful
social reform and that activists in most cases would be better served by adopting non-legal
strategies.
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customers and investors, so too must NGOs (Lowery & Brasher, 2004). Evidence that
competitive differentiation takes place amongst NGOs involved in human rights litigation
abounds. For instance, the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), a Washington, D.C.based human and labor rights advocacy group that has filed ATS cases against numerous
MNEs including Coca-Cola, Wal-Mart, Drummond Co., and Chiquita, boasts in a recent
annual report that it is the sole human rights and labor NGO to have utilized both ATS
litigation and more conventional tactics, such as boycotts, as part of its advocacy efforts
(Holzmeyer, 2009).
In sum, there are reasons to expect that both interest and identity factors may
influence the targeting decisions of NGOs that file ATS litigation against corporations.
We next develop and test a series of hypotheses based on these expectations.

XV. Hypotheses
In this section we put forth a series of hypotheses about the factors we believe
may influence the targeting decisions of NGOs filing ATS lawsuits against extractive
firms. These hypotheses consider both interest-based and identity-based factors.

Interest-based Factors

1. Social Performance – Jones (1991) suggested that observers seeking to understand
what motivates individuals to take action ought to consider the “moral intensity” of the
issue at hand. A key element of moral intensity is the “magnitude of the consequences”
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associated with the focal issue.51 Issues that are perceived to threaten individual interests
in a clear, direct, and profound way are more likely to stimulate action than those which
pose a less obvious, immediate, or serious threat. While Jones developed his theory to
explain individual action, Rowley and Berman (2000) have argued that the logic is also
applicable to stakeholder groups. As such, we might presume that NGOs seeking to
promote their interests and agendas would deploy their limited resources in an effort to
change the behavior of the firms they perceive to most acutely threaten these interests -namely those generating the largest negative social and environmental impacts (i.e., the
worst social performers).
In addition to pressuring these poor performers to change their ways, activists
might calculate that suing the most egregious offenders could send a powerful signal to
other firms with questionable labor and environmental practices or those considering
investments in countries where human rights abuses are pervasive (Davis, 2008).
Anecdotal evidence supports the idea that activist groups base their adversarial targeting
decisions at least in part on the firm’s past conduct. For instance, Hendry (2006) found
that nearly three-fourths of ENGO leaders she interviewed cited the magnitude of the

51

Other components of moral intensity include social consensus, probability of effect, temporal
immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect (Jones, 1991).
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consequences associated with a firm’s behavior toward the natural environment (e.g.,
impacts on biodiversity, climate change, and human health) as critical factors in their
targeting decisions. We therefore propose:

H1 – Firms with relatively poor social performance are more likely to be targeted with
ATS lawsuits than firms with relatively good social performance.
Identity-based Factors

2. Firm size – There are legitimate reasons why stakeholder groups would choose to
target large firms with ATS lawsuits. After all, these firms are often market leaders in
their industries and have high social prominence (Miles, 1987; Salancik, 1979; Suchman,
1995). Such firms may also have well-known brands. While such brands are often viewed
as an asset for the firm, conveying information to consumers about the firm’s corporate
values and the quality and authenticity of its products and services (O’Rourke, 2005),
they represent a liability from the perspective of the activist group that can be exploited
through coercive tactics designed to damage these intangible assets (Conroy, 2007).
Indeed, as Klein (1999) observes: “the more ambitious a company has been in branding
the cultural landscape… the more likely it is to have generated a silent battalion of critics
waiting to pounce.”
Targeting large, prominent firms may also help mobilize support from members
and other organizations within the NGO’s network (Rowley & Berman, 2000). Amnesty
International’s recent campaign against Shell for its allegedly damaging business
activities in the Niger Delta is a case in point. The NGO admits that it selected Shell as

113

the target for the campaign – its largest ever against a single company – because it has a
very well-known brand that is useful in mobilizing activists (Williamson, 2009). And
targeting large, prominent firms may also assist NGO fundraising efforts, since donors
tend to respond favorably to high-profile campaigns that attract media attention
(Weisbrod, 1998).
In addition to the identity-enhancing benefits that may accrue to organizations
from targeting large firms, such actions may also bring benefits to individuals within
these organizations. Organization leaders, in particular, may experience enhanced
recognition and respect as a result of high-profile campaigns against market leaders
(David et al., 2007; Lenox & Eesley, 2009). And while the probability of prevailing in a
legal dispute against a large firm may be slim, the potential payoff, including sweeping
changes to company and industry practices that impact an entire organizational field, may
merit the investment (Hendry, 2006). And in the case of an ATS lawsuit, the payoff
might be a lucrative financial settlement or a favorable jury verdict accompanied by
millions of dollars in damages, providing NGOs with the resources to fund future cases.
Based on this, we propose the following:

H2 – The larger the firm, the more likely it is to be targeted with an ATS lawsuit.

3. Reputation - In recent years management researchers have devoted increasing attention
to the topic of corporate reputation, exploring its antecedents and outcomes (Lange, Lee,
& Dai, 2011; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). Broadly defined as a
perceptual representation of the firm’s overall appeal to key stakeholders compared with
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leading rivals based on past actions (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), corporate reputation is
widely seen as having considerable economic value (Fombrun, 2001). Indeed, Lev (2001)
estimates that “intangible factors,” which include a firm’s reputation, comprise up to fivesixths of the market capitalization of the S&P 500 firms. In addition to being able to
charge a premium for their products and services, highly-reputed firms may have an
advantage over rivals in the competition talented workers, reliable suppliers, and low-cost
investment capital (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Turban & Greening,
1997). A good reputation may also confer insurance-like benefits in the event of a crisis,
cushioning the firm from potentially negative outcomes (Jones, Jones, & Little, 2000;
Schnietz & Epstein, 2005; Godfrey, Merill, & Hansen, 2009). In short, a good reputation
in marketplace is a powerful intangible asset that may represent a source of competitive
advantage for its owner (Hall, 1992; Roberts & Dowling, 2002).
But research suggests that a firm’s reputation may also be a source of
vulnerability -- especially if it is perceived that the company has failed to live up to social
expectations (King & Pearce, 2010). Indeed, highlighting hypocrisies so as to “hoist the
firm on its own petard” has become a key stratagem of anti-corporate campaigns (Bartley
& Child, 2007; Manheim, 2001; O’Rourke, 2005). Given the great lengths to which firms
go to build their reputations through philanthropy and other corporate citizenship
initiatives (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006), NGOs may calculate that managers concerned
with safeguarding their firm’s reputational assets might be willing to make concessions in
the face of activist pressure that could jeopardize the value of these assets – a phenomena
that Spar and LaMure (2003) refer to as “preemptive capitulation.” Such concessions
might include changes to policies identified as objectionable by activists or the settlement
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of lawsuits on generous terms. Stakeholder groups might also believe that targeting
highly reputed firms would send a message to firms further down the status hierarchy
(Bartley & Child, 2007), while generating enhanced commitment from members and
donors. Based on this logic we propose:

H3 – Firms with good reputations are more likely to be targeted with ATS lawsuits than
firms with poor reputations.

4. Financial Performance - There are reasons to expect that activist groups considering
potential corporate targets for ATS litigation might choose firms that have recently
experienced weak financial performance. After all, theory suggests that the managers of
financially troubled firms may be more sensitized to the concerns of external
stakeholders, and more willing to accommodate them, fearing that further “bad news”
could trigger even steeper declines in sales or market share, the loss of legitimacy, or
enhanced external monitoring (King, 2008). But an alternative logic suggests that firms
with weak financial performance may be unattractive targets for activist pressure. Such
firms, after all, typically have less slack than firms with good financial performance
(Cyert & March, 1963), and thus fewer resources to make concessions. Indeed,
financially distressed firms might be focused primarily on survival, and thus primarily
attuned to the needs of primary stakeholders. Conversely, managers of firms with good
financial performance may view concessions to secondary stakeholders in the form of
changes to operating practices, the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
initiatives, or payments to settle lawsuits as a type of insurance policy that could generate
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goodwill (Godfrey, 2005). Such concessions might also be viewed as a way to help
bolster trust and legitimacy and buffer the firm from possible future activist attacks
(Baron 2001; Baron & Diermeier, 2007). Based on this latter logic, we propose:

H4 – The better a firm’s financial performance, the more likely it is to be targeted with
ATS lawsuits.

XVI. Methodology

Data Collection Technique
The sample for this study is drawn from multiple data sources. Information on all
ATS lawsuits filed against MNEs involved in natural resource extraction and production
between 1996 and 2010 was gathered using the LexisNexis and Westlaw legal databases.
We selected 1996 as the start date for our study since the first major human rights-related
corporate ATS lawsuit (Doe v. Unocal) was filed that year. Our legal research was
supplemented by searching business news abstracts in Bloomberg Law, Lexis-Nexis, and
ProQuest for articles about the filing of human rights-related civil lawsuits against
extractive corporations published in the major international business press (e.g., The Wall
Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Financial Times) and wire services (e.g.,
Bloomberg, Dow Jones, Reuters, and the Associated Press). Keywords searches were
conducted using terms such as “alien tort,” “civil litigation,” “lawsuit,” “human rights,”
and individual company names, obtaining information on ATS lawsuits involving 32
multinational corporate defendants. This was reduced to 14 cases after eliminating
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foreign-headquartered companies, privately owned firms, and firms that were sued by
private law firms without NGO involvement. See Appendix B for a list of corporate
defendants in ATS litigation and a brief synopsis of the cases.
Our final sample includes a variety of extractive firms, including those that
explore for and process petroleum, natural gas, coal, and precious metals, as well as
several that provide infrastructure and services for these endeavors. Represented in our
sample are defendants in large class-action lawsuits with dozens of MNEs such as the
South African Apartheid litigation (Khulamani v. Barclay’s National Bank Ltd.), which
seeks damages from multinational companies and banks that did business with Pretoria
between 1948 and 1994, and cases with a single corporate defendant, such as Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., involving charges of complicity in a violent crackdown by the Nigerian
military against unarmed protesters at an offshore oil platform. Our sample also includes
several firms that had more than one ATS lawsuit filed against them during the time
series, including Exxon Mobil (2), Chevron (2), and Occidental Petroleum (4).
In order to assess the likelihood of that a specific firm might be sued under ATS,
we created a second (matching) database of privately-owned U.S. extractive firms that
have not been sued under this statute. This control sample was culled from the 2010
Forbes Global list of the world’s 2,000 largest publicly owned corporations by
performing searches using the industry filters “Oil and Gas Operations,” “Diversified
Metals and Mining,” “Aluminum,” and “Construction Services.” These searches yielded
40 U.S. firms. We narrowed the list to 36 firms by eliminating companies that did not
have five consecutive years of financial or KLD data (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella,
2006). We then examined the two digit Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) codes of the
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firms on the two lists to assure that they were similar and proportional in composition.
The SIC codes of the sample firms are as follows: 10 – Metal mining; 12 – Coal mining;
13 – Oil and gas extraction; 16 – Heavy construction, except building; and 49 – Electric,
gas, and sanitary services. See Appendix B for the list of firms in our comparison sample.
Our combined sample (sued and not sued firms) consists of 50 companies, with
2010 market capitalizations ranging from $3.5 billion (Tesoro) to $407 billion (Exxon
Mobil). The average market cap is roughly $35 billion. In terms of assets, the sample
firms range from $1.7 billion (Walter Energy) to approximately $302.5 billion (Exxon
Mobil), with an average of $32.7 billion. In terms of revenue generation, they range from
about $520 million in annual sales (EXCO Resources) to $342 billion (Exxon Mobil),
with mean sales of approximately $29 billion. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for
the firms in our combined sample.

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Firms in Combined Sample

Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Sales2010

43

.52

341.60

28.6861

62.89131

Profits2010

43

-1.10

30.50

2.3717

5.52759

Assets2010

43

1.70

302.50

32.7028

55.08475

Market Cap

43

3.50

407.20

34.8558

67.33764

Valid N (listwise)

43

Dependent Variable
Our variable of interest in this study is whether the firm was a defendant in an
ATS lawsuit filed by an NGO plaintiff or with NGO legal representation between 1996
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and 2010. A “1” indicates that the firm was sued at least once during the 15-year time
series; a “0” indicates that the firm was not sued.

Independent Variables
We examine whether certain characteristics of the corporate defendant are
associated with a higher probability of being sued to test hypotheses 1-4. According to
hypothesis 1 (Social performance), firms with poor social performance should experience
a higher probability of being sued. To assess this hypothesis, we use data from Kinder,
Lydenburg, Domini’s (KLD) Socrates database, accessed through Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS). The KLD index is the most commonly used measure of
corporate social performance (Hillman & Keim, 2001). It has been extensively used in
empirical research in the fields of strategy (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Godfrey et al.,
2009), international business (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006), and business and society
(Rehbein et al., 2004).
Derived from a variety of sources including annual surveys, annual reports, proxy
statements, quarterly reports, and articles in the business press, the KLD index assesses
the corporate social performance of some 650 publicly listed U.S.-based firms along a
series of dimensions ranging from community relations to the treatment of women and
minorities. Each of the 12 KLD categories contains a number of items which are assigned
a “1” or a “0” depending on whether the firm meets certain criteria. Seven of these
categories are qualitative in the sense that they consist of both strengths and concerns,
whereas the other five are exclusionary, in that they are comprised of concerns only.
Following past research (e.g., Strike et al., 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009) we use the seven
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qualitative categories (community involvement, corporate governance, employee
relations, environmental stewardship, diversity, human rights, and product quality) to
create a composite social responsibility variable for each firm. We do this by adding the
strengths and subtracting the weaknesses for each category of each year, and then
averaging these firm-year scores across the entire time series (Rehbein et al., 2004).
According to hypothesis 2 (firm size), firms that are large in size should
experience a higher probability of being sued because their social prominence makes
them attractive targets for activists seeking to maximize publicity and mobilize support.
Although researchers have used various measures as proxies for firm size, including total
sales (David et al., 2007; Hillman, Shropshire, & Canella, 2007; Hambrick & Canella,
2004) and number of employees (Rehbein et al., 2004), total assets is the most commonly
used measure in the strategy and IB literatures (Lenox & Eesley, 2009; Strike et al., 2006;
Bartley & Child, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2005; Oxley & Schnietz, 2001; King, 2008). As
such, we obtain the total assets of each firm in the sample from Compustat and calculate
its average over the 15-year time series.
According to hypothesis 3 (reputation), firms that have reputations for being
admired are more likely to be targeted with ATS lawsuits than those without such
reputations. To assess this hypothesis, we use data from Fortune magazine’s list of
America’s Most Admired Companies. Published every year since 1983, the Fortune list
reports the results of a survey conducted the previous year of some 10,000 business
executives and market analysts. These executives are asked to rate the top firms in their
own industries based on eight criteria: innovation, financial soundness, employee talent,
use of corporate assets, long-term investment value, social responsibility, quality of
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management, and quality of products and services. Many organization researchers have
used the Fortune list as an indicator of a company’s overall reputation among
stakeholders (King, 2008; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Staw & Epstein, 2000; Brown &
Perry, 1994; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Indeed, it is the most commonly used measure
of corporate reputation in current strategy and organization research (Sabate & Puente,
2003; Basdeo et al., 2006). Since there is only minor variation in the list’s composition
from year to year, we follow past research and create a dichotomous reputation variable,
coding the firm “1” if it appeared on the list in any year of the time series, and “0”
otherwise (Bartley & Child, 2007).
To test hypothesis 4, that firms with better financial performance should
experience a higher probability of being sued, we calculate the firm’s return on assets
(ROA). A commonly used measure of profitability, ROA involves dividing the firm’s
annual net income by its total assets (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Bartley & Child, 2007;
Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Our measure is the natural logarithm of the mean ROA for
each firm in the sample over the 15 year time series. Log transformation was performed
to assist with interpretation (Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003).

Statistical Analysis
We examine the relationship between firm characteristics and the probability of
being sued under ATS by estimating a binary logistic regression model (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007). Logistic regression, which predicts the probability of an outcome (e.g.,
membership in a group) based on a set of predictor variables, is the appropriate statistical
technique for this study since our research question deals with the issue of prediction and
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our dependent variable is categorical in nature (sued/not sued) (Mertler & Vannatta,
2005). As Fraas and Newman (2003) observe, the procedure used to calculate the
coefficients in logistic regression compares the probability of an event occurring with the
probability of its not occurring for each subject in the sample. This ratio of the two
probability values is referred to as the odds value.
While other techniques such as OLS and discriminant analysis could have been
employed, logistic regression has several advantages (Newman, Brown, & Fraas, 2004).
First, it requires no assumptions about the distributions of the explanatory variables be
made by the researcher – they may be normally distributed, linearly related, or have equal
variances within each group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Second, the probability values
generated by a logistics regression are bounded by the values of zero and one – unlike the
values estimated by an OLS regression model (Fraas & Newman, 2003). As such, logistic
regression is a particularly versatile statistical technique well suited to this research.

XVII. Results
Table 7 provides a correlation matrix for our dependent and independent
variables. As can be seen, all of the independent variables are correlated with our variable
of interest.
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix
Correlations
Lawsuit
Lawsuit

Pearson Correlation

KLD
1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
KLD

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Assets_log

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Admired

.588

Admired
**

.405

ROA_x_100
*

.327

.457**

.000

.004

.020

.001

50

50

50

50

50

.588**

1

.339*

.262

.319*

.016

.066

.024

50

50

50

1

**

.268

.000

.060

.000
50

50

**

*

.405

.339

.004

.016

50

.543

50

50

50

50

Pearson Correlation

*

.327

.262

**

1

.143

Sig. (2-tailed)

.020

.066

.000

50

50

50

50

50

**

*

.319

.268

.143

1

.001

.024

.060

.323

50

50

50

50

N
ROA_x_100

Assets_log
**

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.457

.543

.323

50

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

To assure that multicollinearity amongst the predictor variables was not a
problem, we performed an OLS regression to generate variance inflation factors and
found that none exceeded 3, a value well below the accepted maximum of 10
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) (See Table 8).
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Table 8: Tolerance Statistics for Independent Variables
Coefficientsa
Model

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
B

(Constant)

Std. Error
-.677

.421

KLD

.086

.024

Assets_log

.048

Admired
ROA_x_100
a.

Coefficients

Collinearity Statistics
t

Beta

Sig.

Tolerance

VIF

-1.610

.114

.430

3.566

.001**

.820 1.219

.051

.129

.947

.349

.644 1.552

.097

.120

.106

.813

.421

.698 1.433

.035

.015

.269

2.298

.026**

.868 1.152

Dependent Variable: Lawsuit

** = significant at p<.05

Next, we ran a binary logistic regression to determine whether any of our
independent variables (social performance; firm size; reputation; and financial
performance) were predictors of the likelihood of ATS legal action (sued/not sued). Our
regression results indicate the overall model was statistically significant in distinguishing
between sued and not sued firms. The -2 Log Likelihood provides an index of model fit.
A perfect model would have a -2 Log Likelihood of 0; the lower this value, the better the
models fits the data (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). The -2 Log Likelihood coefficient for
our model (29.082) indicates a good fit. The chi-square for our model (29.084) is
significant (p<.0001), suggesting that the model is significantly better in predicting
subject membership than the constant-only model (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Cox &
Snell R-square and Nagelkerke R-square coefficients of .454 and .653, respectively,
indicate that our model accounts for a substantial proportion of the variability in our
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dependent variable – whether a firm was sued. Table 9 provides several indices of overall
model fit.

Table 9: Indices of Model Fit

Model Summary
Step

Cox & Snell R

Nagelkerke R

Square

Square

-2 Log likelihood
a

1

29.084

.454

.653

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Table 10 presents the classification table. As can be observed, the model did a
somewhat better job correctly predicting firms that were not sued (94.4%) than firms that
were sued (78.6%). Overall, our model correctly classified 90% of the cases. In other
words, we can infer that our model would correctly predict the likelihood that a new firm
would be sued under ATS nine times out of ten.

Table 10: Classification Table

Classification Tablea
Observed

Predicted
Lawsuit
0

Step 1

Lawsuit

Percentage
Correct

1

0

34

2

94.4

1

3

11

78.6

Overall Percentage

90.0

a. The cut value is .500
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The summary of model variables is displayed in Table 11. Our results include
Wald statistics for each coefficient.52 A logistic coefficient is considered to differ
significantly from zero when the probability value of the Wald statistic is less than the
established alpha level (Fraas & Newman, 2003). The Wald logistic coefficients indicate
that both social performance (as determined by KLD ratings) (.013) and financial
performance (ROA) (.021) significantly predict the likelihood of being sued (p<.05).
Both signs are in the right direction as well, indicating that a higher KLD score (i.e.,
greater net number of concerns) and higher return on assets are positively associated with
the likelihood of being sued. Neither of the other two independent variables is significant
at conventional levels. The results in Table 11 are consistent with those generated from
our OLS model (Table 8). In that model, both social performance and financial
performance account for a significant amount of variance that is unique from that
accounted for by other variables.

Table 11: Summary of Model Variables

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 1a

KLD

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.840

.340

6.104

1

.013**

2.317

Assets_log

-.276

.564

.239

1

.625

.759

Admired

2.805

1.712

2.686

1

.101

16.531

.437

.190

5.312

1

.021**

1.548

-6.194

4.045

2.345

1

.126

.002

ROA_x_100
Constant
a.

S.E.

Variable(s) entered on step 1: KLD, Assets_log, Admired, ROA_x_100

** = significant at p<.05

52

The Wald test is the square ratio of its coefficient to its standard error (Fraas & Newman,
2003).
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Further insights into our results may be gleaned by examining the odds ratios of
the regression coefficients in Table 10. Odds ratios represent the change in the likelihood
of a dependent variable arising from a one-unit change in the independent variable. An
odds ratio of 1.00 indicates no effect. Odds ratios of greater than 1.00 indicate that
increases in the independent variable increase the likelihood of the dependent variable –
in this case the likelihood of being sued. Odds ratios of less than 1.00 indicate negative
associations, or that increases in the independent variable decrease the likelihood of being
sued (Hillman et al., 2006).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that social performance will be negatively associated with
ATS lawsuit filings. Firms with good social performance are expected to be less
attractive targets for activists than firms that abuse workers and the environment. The
evidence in Table 10 supports this interest-based hypothesis. The odds ratio for our social
performance measure indicates that moving from the sample mean to one unit below the
mean in social performance more than doubles the likelihood of being sued (odds ratio =
2.317, p<.05). This finding is consistent with past research by Lenox and Eesley (2009),
who found that ENGOs tend to target the firms with poor environmental performance
(i.e., high toxic emissions).
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firm size will be positively associated with ATS
lawsuit filings. Larger firms are expected to be more attractive targets for activist groups.
The evidence in Table 10 does not support this identity-based hypothesis (odds ratio =
1.00). This result is somewhat surprising given that past research has demonstrated that
activist groups tend to target large firms for both boycotts (King, 2008) and shareholder
resolutions (Rehbein et al., 2004). A possible explanation is that activist groups that file
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ATS lawsuits have less discretion over whom they can sue than groups initiating other
types of anti-corporate challenges since there must be a legal basis for their claims, and as
such, targeting the largest firms, while perhaps desirable, is not always feasible. Another
possibility is that NGOs initiating ATS lawsuits avoid suing the largest firms owing to
the possibility that these resource-rich firms will be more formidable opponents and less
likely to make concessions. A third possibility is that smaller MNEs are more likely to
commit human rights violations than larger MNEs, which presumably have greater
resources to devote to human-rights related training and due diligence.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that firm reputation will be positively associated with ATS
lawsuit filings. Better reputed firms are expected to be more attractive targets for activist
groups. The evidence in Table 10 does not support this identity-based hypothesis (odds
ratio = 1.00). This result is also somewhat surprising given King’s (2008) finding that
activist groups tend to boycott firms with strong reputations. Again, it is possible that
NGOs that file ATS litigation have less discretion in their targeting choices than do firms
employing alternative tactics and cannot always select firms with good reputations in
hopes of tarnishing these intangible assets. It is also possible that firms with good
reputations tend to be better corporate citizens and avoid engaging in the types of
behaviors abroad that are likely to result in litigation.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that firm financial performance will be positively associated
with ATS lawsuit filings. Firms with better financial performance are expected to be
more attractive targets for activist groups. The evidence in Table 10 supports this
identity-based hypothesis. The odds ratio for our financial performance measure indicates
that moving from the sample mean to one unit above the mean in financial performance
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increases the likelihood of being sued by roughly 55 percent (odds ratio =1.548, p<.05).
This finding is consistent with King (2008), who found that activist groups tend to
boycott firms that have experienced weak financial performance, and Eesley and Lenox
(2005), who reported that ENGOs tend to select firms that are financially sound as targets
for anti-corporate campaigns involving boycotts, protests, lawsuits, letter-writing
campaigns, and shareholder resolutions.

XVIII. Discussion
This research contributes to the growing body of empirical literature that
examines the private political strategies of activist groups (Baron, 2003; King, 2008;
Eesley & Lenox, 2009; Lenox & Eesley, 2005; Bartley & Child, 2007; Rehbein et al.,
2004; Reid & Toffel, 2009). Given the rise in transnational tort-related litigation against
MNEs in recent years – and the attention these cases have garnered from business
executives, policymakers, and the press -- we felt it important to assess how NGOs that
file human rights-related civil litigation select their corporate targets. We chose to study
ATS lawsuits filed against extractive companies given the size and importance of this
industry to the global economy – in 2006, the world’s 39 largest publicly listed oil
companies generated nearly $2.8 trillion in revenue (Rangan & Barton, 2010) -- and the
fact that roughly one-quarter of all the corporate ATS lawsuits filed to date have been
against firms engaged in natural resource extraction or production (Drimmer, 2010).
Our results suggest that activist groups sometimes choose their corporate targets
with the aim of changing the practices of social performance laggards (i.e., based on what
they do). But they also indicate that some ATS lawsuits are targeted at highly profitable
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firms, irrespective of their social performance (i.e., based on who they are). Although we
did not directly test our general propositions, it is possible to infer from these results that
stakeholder groups are motivated by both interest and identity-based rationales in
choosing corporate targets for ATS lawsuits – a finding that is broadly consistent with
past empirical research on stakeholder activism (de Bakker & den Hond, 2007; Rehbein
et al., 2004).
Our findings have important implications for theory. Despite more than 25 years
of research on stakeholder theory since Freeman’s seminal contribution (1984), scholars
know relatively little about the mechanisms by which external agents influence
organizational behavior and the contextual factors that moderate their success (de Bakker
& den Hond, 2008; King & Soule, 2007; LaPlume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008).

By

identifying the factors that underlie the targeting decisions of NGOs initiating ATS legal
challenges against MNEs, this research addresses the gap in our knowledge of the
motives and tactical choices stakeholders make (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008), thereby
advancing stakeholder theory.
This research also has significance for practice. Given the sharp rise in tort-related
lawsuits against MNEs in recent years, managers need to have a better understanding of
the likelihood of litigation prior to entering new markets – particularly since the
anecdotal evidence suggests that financial markets respond unfavorably to the filing of
ATS lawsuits (Kobrin, 2004; Kurlantzick, 2004). Our finding that stakeholder groups
select their targets for ATS litigation based in part on their conduct -- confronting firms
with poor social performance -- would seem to provide a strong justification for firms to
improve their overseas practices and stakeholder relations. Possible avenues for action
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might include adopting private certification schemes (Conroy, 2007; Vogel, 2008) and
embracing cross-sectoral partnerships with NGOs (Dahan et al., 2010). But it is also
possible that managers may seek to blunt the threat of ATS litigation by undertaking
political moves to defeat the litigation or making cosmetic changes to policies and
practices (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Shamir, 2004). Future research might seek to
tease out the factors that influence firm response to civil litigation. To this end, Spar and
LaMure (2003) offer a framework that may serve as a useful starting point. They identify
three strategies that firms facing activist pressure may adopt: preemption, capitulation,
and resistance, with the choice of strategy being influenced by transaction costs, brand
impact, and competitive position.
Future research also might examine whether there are significant differences
amongst activist groups that file corporate ATS litigation and whether these differences
influence their targeting decisions. For instance, it is possible that some stakeholder
groups are motivated primarily by an interest in changing the target firm’s behavior,
while other are driven largely by a desire to attract publicity, generate resources, and
achieve individual notoriety. A better understanding of the motivations of different
stakeholder groups could enable corporate managers to craft more effective risk
mitigation strategies.
Another important avenue of inquiry involves examining whether there are
systematic differences in the types of firms targeted for lawsuits by NGOs and those
targeted by private class-action laws firms. This is a matter of some urgency given the
increase in transnational tort litigation filed by class-action attorneys working on
contingency fees (Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007).
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While this research makes an important contribution to our understanding of
stakeholder legal activism directed against MNEs, it has several limitations. First it
examines only a single industry and it is not clear that the findings are generalizable
beyond the extractive sector. Second, it analyzes ATS lawsuits filed against U.S. firms
only and it is possible that the targeting decisions of NGOs vary with respect to foreign
firms, which are also liable under ATS. Third, it considers only characteristics of the
target firm as determinants of stakeholder action and it is possible that characteristics of
the NGOs (e.g., ideology, power, and legitimacy) could play an important role in
targeting decisions (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Fourth, it is
possible that firms are targeted not because of interest or identity factors, but because of
opportunities. For example, large firms are more likely than small firms to have complex,
operations involving subsidiaries in multiple foreign countries, and it is this complexity
which may create exposure to lawsuits (Miles 1987).
Notwithstanding these caveats and limitations, this research provides evidencebased insights into the strategic and tactical decision-making of NGOs pursuing humanrights-related litigation that will hopefully stimulate further research into this important,
emerging area of business-society relations.

IXX. Conclusion
MNEs with operations in the developing world face a growing number and
variety of non-market risks that threaten their ability to profit from their investments
(Chambers et al., 2010; Grosse, 2005; Henisz, Mansfield, & Von Glinow, 2010). Among
these is the possibility that they will be sued by secondary stakeholder groups in U.S.
federal courts over allegations of complicity in overseas human rights abuses. Given the
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huge potential liabilities associated with these cases, they can represent “bet-the-company
risks” (Brown, 2011). These risks are exacerbated when stakeholder groups employ
extra-legal tactics to gain leverage in the legal proceedings. This dissertation contends
that the threat of transnational legal activism represents a new and serious concern to
global business that merits attention from management, IB, and strategy researchers. By
examining the antecedents and consequences of such legal activism in both conceptual
and empirical settings, this work provides a foundation for future scholarship.
As this dissertation shows, the filing of ATS lawsuits is associated with a
significant loss of shareholder wealth in the weeks leading up to the filing – a loss which
is far greater in magnitude than that associated with other stakeholder tactics such as
protests (King & Soule, 2007) and boycotts (Zadek, 2001). Whether the markets react
because of expectations that the legal process will be lengthy and costly and divert
managerial attention from running the company, or because it may lead to a costly
settlement, or because it may culminate in a billion-dollar judgment at trial, or simply
because it may result in serious reputational harm is unclear and warrants future
investigation.
What is clear, however, is that investors view these lawsuits as significant events
that cloud the target firm’s future economic prospects. This research also suggests that
activist groups select targets for litigation-based campaigns based on both who they are
(i.e., highly profitable companies) and what they do, with extractive firms viewed as poor
social performers facing a higher probability of being sued than those with better social
performance.
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This research has implications for theory, practice, and policy. From a theoretical
standpoint, it contributes to the scholarly effort to understand how a range of relatively
resource-poor, powerless, and marginalized stakeholder groups (Gardberg & Newburry,
2010) are using “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) to challenge corporate policies and practices,
promote institutional change, and press for new and binding global norms governing the
conduct of international business (Vogel, 2010). These groups include NGOs (Doh &
Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh), social movements (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008;
Soule, 2009), and transnational advocacy networks (Riesse et al., 1999). It also addresses
the gap in our knowledge of the motives and tactical choices of stakeholder groups that
target corporations and the consequences of these actions (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008),
thereby advancing stakeholder theory.
This research also has relevance for practice. Given the sharp rise in human
rights-related lawsuits against MNEs in recent years, managers need to have a better
understanding of the likelihood and costs (both direct and indirect) of litigation prior to
entering new markets – particularly those with endemic human and labor rights
violations, ethnic and social cleavages, and a recent history of political turmoil. Our
findings provide strong justification for multinational managers to seek ways to improve
their overseas business practices and stakeholder relations, so as to make their firms less
attractive targets. But our research suggests that becoming a model corporate citizen may
not immunize a firm from being targeted by stakeholder groups with identity-based
motivations.
This research also has important policy implications. The sharp rise in foreign
direct investment to emerging markets in recent years has been heralded as a promising
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development in global economic affairs (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). But if MNEs perceive
the legal risks of doing business in emerging markets to be too great, they may scale back
their investments or withdraw entirely, with grave consequences for local development
(Hufbauer, 2009). There is some evidence that such a retrenchment is already occurring.
Chiquita, which has been sued numerous times under the ATS in recent years owing to
revelations that the company paid “protection money” to left-wing and right-wing
terrorist organizations in Colombia, sold off its Colombian assets in 2004 -- reportedly at
a significant financial loss (Baue, 2007). Canada’s Talisman Energy, another target of
ATS litigation, divested its $770 million stake in a Sudanese petroleum project in 2002.
Meanwhile, Exxon Mobil announced in August 2011 that it was selling off its interests in
three natural gas companies in Aceh, Indonesia – less than a month after a previously
dismissed ATS lawsuit stemming from alleged human rights violations by Indonesian
soldiers protecting its Aceh facilities was reinstated by a U.S. federal appeals court
(Driver, 2001).53
U.S. government officials and policy analysts have also warned that the growing
tide of ATS litigation could strain relations with foreign governments, which object to
U.S. efforts to impose its legal authority over what they view as purely domestic matters
(Davis, 2008), and prompt the exit of Western MNEs from countries with weak
governing institutions, to the detriment of U.S. policy in the struggle against international
terrorism (Shamir, 2004). A related worry is that the departure of Western firms from

53

The lawsuit, brought by Indonesian villagers who claim that they and their family members
were beaten, tortured, kidnapped, raped, and murdered by Indonesian soldiers guarding Exxon’s
natural gas operations, was dismissed in 2009, but overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 ruling (Kendall, 2011).
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developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America could open the door to stateowned firms from emerging nations that are less beholden to pressures from civil society
and less committed to social responsibility (Schrage, 2003). Indeed, when Talisman
Energy divested from an oil pipeline project in the Sudan in 2003 amidst intense
stakeholder pressure, India’s state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited purchased
its assets. The project continues to this day, but without the community development
projects and transparency initiatives that Talisman claims it had implemented (Manhas,
2007).
But a compelling argument can also be made that corporate liability for overseas
human rights violations under ATS actually advances U.S. national interests. For one, it
may promote exemplary corporate conduct in a way that voluntary and non-binding CSRrelated initiatives do not (Vogel, 2010), thereby showing authoritarian host governments
and their citizens how responsible capitalism and democratic politics can go hand in
hand. Indeed, as Herz (2008: 228) observes, “the potential for aiding and abetting liability
ensures that corporation will not only explain democratic values and institutions to
repressive governments, but will also demonstrate that those values and institutions are
not merely aspirations but actually govern the conduct of members of a democratic
society.”
Additionally, by pressuring MNEs to avoid or divest from countries where basic
human rights are not upheld, such litigation may prompt host governments to clean up
their acts in order to avoid pariah status from international investors. As Kurlantzick
(2004: 66) observes, MNEs appear to be in a unique position to influence authoritarian
regimes in places like Myanmar that have resisted the demands of NGOs and foreign

137

governments to reform: “Officials close to the Rangoon junta say that the regime cares
little about the pressure tactics of the United States, Britain, and other Western
governments, because they have little impact on the everyday lives of the generals. But,
the officials say, Yangon’s military leaders do pay attention when companies pull out,
since a collapsing economy hits their pocketbooks.”
Meanwhile, to the extent that the threat of extraterritorial litigation encourages
MNE managers to be more discerning when choosing foreign business partners, more
directly involved in formulating policies governing operations, and more vocal in their
advocacy of human rights within their firms and across their supply chains, it may serve a
useful purpose (Schrage, 2003). The net result may not only be higher workplace
standards and safer working conditions in overseas factories, farms, and mines, but more
productive and committed workers, greater legitimacy, less business risk, and enhanced
sustainability.
While these policy questions are not likely to be settled any time soon, this
research helps clarify them, while contributing to our understanding of an important new
phenomena in business-society relations with profound implications for MNEs, their
stakeholders, and host societies.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A – List of ATS Cases and Dates by Firm
Date
Corporation

3/3/2000
Abercrombie &
Fitch
Anglo American
4/4/2003

Archer Daniels
Midland

7/15/2005

Barclay's PLC
11/12/2002
BP
11/12/2002
Brylane Inc.
1/13/1999
Caci International,
Inc.

6/9/2004

Caci International,
Inc.

7/1/2008

Caterpillar
3/15/2005
Chevron
5/28/1999
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Chevron
11/12/2002
Chiquita Brands
Intl

6/7/2007

Chiquita Brands
Intl

6/14/2007

Chiquita Brands
Intl

7/19/2007

Chiquita Brands
Intl

11/14/2007

Chiquita Brands
Intl

8/13/2008

Chiquita Brands
Intl

4/14/2010

Citigroup
6/17/2002
Citigroup
11/12/2002
Coca-Cola
7/20/2001
Coca-Cola
11/10/2005
Credit Suisse
6/17/2002
Cutter & Buck, Inc
1/13/1999
Daimler-Chrysler
8/19/2002
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Daimler-Chrysler
11/12/2002
Daimler-Chrysler
1/14/2004
Dayton Hudson
Corp

1/13/1999

Deutsche Bank
11/12/2002
Donna Karen
International

1/13/1999

Dow Chemical Co
2/2/2004
Dow Chemical Co
9/26/2006
Dress Barn
1/13/1999
Exxon Mobil Corp
6/21/2001
Exxon Mobil Corp
8/2/2002
Exxon Mobil Corp
11/12/2002
Fluor Corp.
11/12/2002
Fluor Corp.
4/4/2003
Ford Motor Co.
11/12/2002
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Freeport-McMoran
4/29/1996
Gap, Inc
1/13/1999
General Motors
11/12/2002
Gold Fields Ltd
5/2/2003
Gymboree Corp.
1/13/1999
Honeywell Int'l
8/2/2002
Hewlett Packard
Co

9/27/2002

IBM
2/12/2001
IBM
6/24/2002
IBM
11/12/2002

J.C. Penney
Company, Inc

1/13/1999

11/12/2002
J.P. Morgan Chase
Jones Apparel
Group
KBR, Inc

1/13/1999

1/13/1999
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Limited, Inc
1/13/1999
Liz Claiborne, Inc
1/13/1999
May Deparment
Stores Company

6/13/1999

Monsanto
2/4/2004
Newmont Mining
Corp.

6/4/2002

Nokia Corp
8/20/2010
Nordstrom, Inc
1/13/1999
Occidental
Petroleum

4/24/2003

Occidental
Petroleum

2/4/2004

Occidental
Petroleum

8/11/2006

Oshkosh B'Gosh
1/13/1999
Pfizer
8/30/2001
Phillips-Van
Heusen

6/13/1999

Rio Tinto
9/6/2000
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Rio Tinto
11/12/2002
Polo Ralph Lauren
1/13/1999
Royal Dutch
Petroleum

11/8/1996

Royal Dutch
Petroleum

8/2/2002

Royal Dutch
Petroleum

9/23/2002

Royal Dutch
Petroleum

11/12/2002

Sasol Ltd
4/7/2003
Sears Roebuck &
Co

6/13/1999

Siemens A G
8/20/2010
Southern Peru
Copper

12/28/2000

Talbots, Inc
3/3/2000
Talisman
11/7/2001
Texaco
11/4/1993
Titan Corp.
6/9/2004
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Tommy Hilfiger
USA Inc.

1/13/1999

Total Fina ELF SA
11/12/2002
UBS
6/17/2002
UBS
11/12/2002
Union Carbide
11/15/1999
Unisys
1/13/1999
Unocal
10/3/1996
Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc

1/13/1999

Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc

9/13/2005

Warnaco, Inc
1/13/1999
Xerox
9/27/2002
Yahoo!
4/18/2007
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APPENDIX B - List of U.S. Extractive Firms Sued Under ATS, 1996-2010

Firm

Year

Case

Country

Allegations

CHEVRON CORP

1999

Bowoto, et al. v. Chevron,
et al.

Nigeria

CHEVRON CORP

2002

Khulumani Group et al. v.
Barclay Nat'l Bank et al.

South Africa

EXXON MOBIL
CORP

2001

John Doe I, et al. v. Exxon
Mobil Corp.

Indonesia

EXXON MOBIL
CORP

2002

Khulumani Group et al. v.
Barclay Nat'l Bank et al.

South Africa

FLUOR CORP

2002

Khulumani Group et al. v.
Barclay Nat'l Bank et al.

South Africa

Plaintiffs allege that the
defendants provided
assistance to and
participated in military
raids by the Nigerian
military against
demonstrators on a
Chevron oil rig.
Plaintiffs allege that the
defendants, which include
businesses from a variety
of sectors, supported
apartheid-related race
discrimination and other
human rights abuses,
including murders,
massacres, imprisonment,
torture, forced removals,
and theft of assets.
Plaintiffs allege that firm
was vicariously liable for
murder, genocide, torture,
kidnapping, and other
crimes against humanity
allegedly committed by
the Indonesian military in
Aceh, in northern Sumatra,
in the course of fighting a
civil war and protecting
the firm’s gas production
facilities.
Plaintiffs allege that the
defendants, which include
businesses from a variety
of sectors, supported
apartheid-related race
discrimination and other
human rights abuses,
including murders,
massacres, imprisonment,
torture, forced removals,
and theft of assets.
Plaintiffs allege that the
defendants, which include
businesses from a variety
of sectors, supported
apartheid-related race

163

FREEPORTMCMORAN

1996

Beanal, et al. v. FreeportMcMoran, Inc.

Indonesia

KBR INC

2008

Adhikari v. Daoud &
Partners v. KRR

Iraq

NEWMONT
MINING CORP

2002

Maugein v. Newmont
Mining Corp. et al.

Peru

OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORP

2003

Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum, et al.

Colombia

OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORP

2004

Vietnam Association for
the Victims of Agent
Orange/Dioxan v. The Dow

Vietnam
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discrimination and other
human rights abuses,
including murders,
massacres, imprisonment,
torture, forced removals,
and theft of assets.
Plaintiffs alleged that
defendant was liable for
environmental abuses,
human rights violations
and genocide, in
connection with its
copper, gold and silver
mining activities in
Indonesia.
Plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant engaged in an
illegal human-trafficking
scheme involving 12
Nepali men, ages 18-27,
who were recruited in
Nepal to work in luxury
hotels in Jordan, but were
instead sent against their
will to work in a U.S.
military base in Iraq. The
Nepalese workers were
kidnapped and killed en
route to the base by
Islamic militants.
Plaintiffs sought redress
for a toxic mercury spill by
a trucking contractor of
the firm that injured more
than 1,000 indigenous
villagers from the Andean
countryside.
Plaintiffs alleged that the
firm provided support to
the Colombian military in
return for protecting
Occidental's pipeline in
Colombia. Support was
instrumental in the
planning and execution of
a helicopter-borne cluster
bomb attack that killed
members of plaintiff’s
family.
Plaintiffs sought damages
from U.S. chemical
manufacturers for the

Chemical Company et al.

OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORP

2006

Shiguago v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp.

Ecuador

OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORP

2007

Carijano v Occidental
Petroleum Corp.

Peru

SOUTHERN
COPPER CORP

2000

Flores v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp.

Peru

UNOCAL CORP

1996

Doe, et al. v. Unocal Corp.

Burma
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Vietnamese victims of
Agent Orange, a toxic
defoliant used by the U.S.
military during the
Vietnam War.
Plaintiffs alleged that the
firm is complicit in human
rights violations
committed by paramilitary
groups that guard the
company’s pipeline.
Plaintifs alleged that the
firm’s illegal disposal of
toxic wastEwater in the
Peruvian Amazon resulted
in severe contamination of
the land and rivers in the
regikn, causing adverse
health effects including
lead and cadmium
poisoning, and damage to
lIvElihoOds.
Plaintiffs, residejts of Peru,
alleged that pollution from
the defendant fIrm’s
miNing, refining, and
smelting opepatiojs caused
a variety of serious human
health problems including
respiratory diseases.
Providing support to the
Burmese military which
allegedly engaged in
forced relocation of
villages, used forced labor,
and engaged in torture,
extrajudicial killings, and
rape in furtherance of a
natural gas pipeline
project.

APPENDIX C - List of U.S. Extractive Firms Not Sued Under ATS, 1996-2010 (Comparison
Sample)
Firm
ALCOA INC

SIC Code
33

Description
Primary Metal Industries

ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

APACHE CORP

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

BAKER HUGHES INC

35

Industrial Machinery and Equipment

CAMERON INTERNATIONAL
CORP

35

Industrial Machinery and Equipment

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

CIMAREX ENERGY CO

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

CONCHO RESOURCES INC

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

CONOCOPHILLIPS

29

Petroleum Refining

CONSOL ENERGY INC

12

Coal Mining

CONTINENTAL RESOURCES INC

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

DENBURY RESOURCES INC

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

DEVON ENERGY CORP

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

El PASO ENERGY

49

Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services

EOG RESOURCES INC

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

EXCO RESOURCES INC

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

FMC TECHNOLOGIES INC

35

Industrial Machinery and Equipment

HALLIBURTON CO

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

HESS CORP

29

Petroleum and Coal Products

JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP
INC

16

Heavy Construction Except Building

MARATHON OIL CORP

29

Petroleum and Coal Products

MURPHY OIL CORP

29

Petroleum and Coal Products
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NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO INC

35

Industrial Machinery and Equipment

NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

NOBLE ENERGY INC

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

PEABODY ENERGY CORP

12

Bituminous Coal/Lignite Surface Mining

PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES
CO

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

QEP RESOURCES INC

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY CO

49

Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services

SPECTRA ENERGY CORP

49

Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services

SUNOCO INC

29

Petroleum and Coal Products

TESORO CORP

29

Petroleum and Coal Products

ULTRA PETROLEUM CORP

13

Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas

VALERO ENERGY CORP

29

Petroleum and Coal Products

WALTER ENERGY INC

12

Coal Mining

WHITING PETROLEUM CORP

13

Oil and Gas Extraction

WILLIAMS COS INC

49

Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
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